{"id":13454201,"url":"https://github.com/Karneades/malware-persistence","last_synced_at":"2025-03-24T05:33:17.350Z","repository":{"id":40279893,"uuid":"251320064","full_name":"Karneades/malware-persistence","owner":"Karneades","description":"Collection of malware persistence and hunting information. Be a persistent persistence hunter!","archived":false,"fork":false,"pushed_at":"2025-01-20T08:55:44.000Z","size":165,"stargazers_count":172,"open_issues_count":0,"forks_count":16,"subscribers_count":8,"default_branch":"master","last_synced_at":"2025-01-20T09:38:41.337Z","etag":null,"topics":["malware","malware-analysis","malware-detection","malware-persistence","persistence","threat-hunting","threat-intelligence"],"latest_commit_sha":null,"homepage":"","language":null,"has_issues":true,"has_wiki":null,"has_pages":null,"mirror_url":null,"source_name":null,"license":"cc-by-sa-4.0","status":null,"scm":"git","pull_requests_enabled":true,"icon_url":"https://github.com/Karneades.png","metadata":{"files":{"readme":"README.md","changelog":null,"contributing":null,"funding":null,"license":"LICENSE","code_of_conduct":null,"threat_model":null,"audit":null,"citation":null,"codeowners":null,"security":null,"support":null,"governance":null,"roadmap":null,"authors":null,"dei":null,"publiccode":null,"codemeta":null}},"created_at":"2020-03-30T13:52:51.000Z","updated_at":"2025-01-20T08:55:46.000Z","dependencies_parsed_at":"2025-01-20T09:32:34.230Z","dependency_job_id":"cc7f1cfc-fe9b-4973-94ee-e2380c9bffb8","html_url":"https://github.com/Karneades/malware-persistence","commit_stats":null,"previous_names":[],"tags_count":0,"template":false,"template_full_name":null,"repository_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub/repositories/Karneades%2Fmalware-persistence","tags_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub/repositories/Karneades%2Fmalware-persistence/tags","releases_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub/repositories/Karneades%2Fmalware-persistence/releases","manifests_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub/repositories/Karneades%2Fmalware-persistence/manifests","owner_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub/owners/Karneades","download_url":"https://codeload.github.com/Karneades/malware-persistence/tar.gz/refs/heads/master","host":{"name":"GitHub","url":"https://github.com","kind":"github","repositories_count":245217334,"owners_count":20579290,"icon_url":"https://github.com/github.png","version":null,"created_at":"2022-05-30T11:31:42.601Z","updated_at":"2022-07-04T15:15:14.044Z","host_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub","repositories_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub/repositories","repository_names_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub/repository_names","owners_url":"https://repos.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/hosts/GitHub/owners"}},"keywords":["malware","malware-analysis","malware-detection","malware-persistence","persistence","threat-hunting","threat-intelligence"],"created_at":"2024-07-31T08:00:51.788Z","updated_at":"2025-03-24T05:33:17.339Z","avatar_url":"https://github.com/Karneades.png","language":null,"funding_links":[],"categories":["Threat Detection and Hunting","Other"],"sub_categories":["Resources","Other Resources"],"readme":"**An awesome list with only the links is found on [awesome-malware-persistence](https://github.com/Karneades/awesome-malware-persistence).**\n\n---\n\n# Collection of malware persistence information\n\nThis repository collects various currently scattered information regarding the\ndetection, the response and the log collection of malware persistence\nmechanisms.\n\nIn short, we look for one of the things which is so common between different\nmalware families: the ability to persist on a target host. Also malware\nassociated with the misleading term \"fileless\" often persists on the target\ntoo, though not through regular files on the file system but through changes\nin configuration files like Windows Registry or cron jobs.\n\nUnfortunately, many malware blog posts include all the various IP and hash\ninformation but only a few highlight the persistence mechanism from an attack,\ndespite that it's one of the more static and more difficult to change\ninformation from an attacker's perspective. Using the persistence mechanism to\nhunt for malware is more robust than the more frequently changed IP addresses\nor hashes.\n\nIf you're only looking for an overview about persistence techniques and some\nlinks to useful resources then see [Overview of commonly used persistence mechanisms](#overview-of-commonly-used-persistence-mechanisms) and [links and resources for detection](#links-and-resources-for-detection). See section [tools](#tools) for some well-known persistence collection tools.\n\nThis repository is regularly updated with new detection resources and tools.\nIf you have inputs then [pull requests](https://github.com/Karneades/malware-persistence/pulls) are more then welcome!\n\n\u003c!-- vim-markdown-toc GFM --\u003e\n\n* [Why bothering with malware persistence?](#why-bothering-with-malware-persistence)\n* [Detection](#detection)\n    * [Approach](#approach)\n    * [Overview of commonly used persistence mechanisms](#overview-of-commonly-used-persistence-mechanisms)\n        * [Linux](#linux)\n        * [MacOS](#macos)\n        * [Windows](#windows)\n        * [Cloud](#cloud)\n        * [All OSes and developer specific changes](#all-oses-and-developer-specific-changes)\n    * [Overview of difficult to detect persistence mechanisms](#overview-of-difficult-to-detect-persistence-mechanisms)\n    * [Persistence through UEFI malware and bootkits](#persistence-through-uefi-malware-and-bootkits)\n    * [Links and resources for detection](#links-and-resources-for-detection)\n    * [Examples](#examples)\n* [Detection Evasion](#detection-evasion)\n* [Testing](#testing)\n* [Response](#response)\n* [Prevention](#prevention)\n* [Tools](#tools)\n    * [Linux](#linux-1)\n    * [MacOS](#macos-1)\n    * [Windows](#windows-1)\n* [Acknowledgement](#acknowledgement)\n\n\u003c!-- vim-markdown-toc --\u003e\n\n## Why bothering with malware persistence?\n\nIf you are an incident responder and have to analyze compromised hosts, do a\ngeneric compromise assessment or if you do threat hunting activities in your\ninfrastructure, then you should get into the topic of persistence mechanisms as\none way to detect known or unknown malware. It's one of the pieces for looking\nfor during IR activities.\n\nLet's start with the [persistence\ntechnique](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/) description used by\n[MITRE](https://attack.mitre.org/):\n\u003e  The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold.\n\u003e\n\u003e Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep \n\u003e access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other \n\u003e interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for \n\u003e persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that \n\u003e let them maintain their foothold on systems, such as replacing or \n\u003e hijacking legitimate code or adding startup code. \n\nOne thing in common between different malware families is that they \n(mostly) try to persist on the target host. Malware associated with the\nmisleading term \"fileless\" often persists on the target too, though not through\nregular files on the file system but through changes in configuration files\nlike Windows Registry or cron jobs.\n\nWhy use the word _mostly_ above? Because there is rare malware which omit\nsetting persistence mechanism on the victim's host itself but reinfect the host\nafter reboot from another system (e.g. DC, where the system is running longtime\non which no persistence is needed at all).\n\nThis gold mine of malware persistence information is a fraction of what other\nlog sources produce. Tens to hundreds of events depending of what you looking\nfor versus thousand to ten thousands of entries for process information.\nTherefore, the analysis of these events reduce the time and the effort\ncompared to other log sources considerably. The signal to noise ratio is also\nmuch lower.\n\nSo, by becoming and being a persistent persistence hunter, you can make use of\nthis treasury. Though not that kind of persistence hunting described in\n[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persistence_hunting)...\n\u003e Persistence hunting (sometimes called endurance hunting) is a hunting\n\u003e technique in which hunters, who may be slower than their prey over short\n\u003e distances, use a combination of running, walking, and tracking to pursue prey\n\u003e until it is exhausted. A persistence hunter must be able to run a long\n\u003e distance over an extended period of time. \n\n## Detection\n\nWhile there are many ways how malware can persist on a host, malware authors\nrely mostly on a handful of techniques. Beside these often used techniques\nsome malware families and more targeted attacks use more advanced mechanisms\nto stay hidden on the system.\n\nKeep in mind that for some persistence techniques escalated privileges are\nrequired and therefore malware running under normal users (and privilege\nescalation left out of consideration) can only set \"user mode\" persistence. So\nif the user on the infected host only use a normal user account then first\nfocus on the user level persistence and secondly look for system level\ntechniques.\n\n### Approach\n\nThe analysis process could involve these steps, as with other incident\nresponse and threat hunting procedures:\n1. Collect the persistence mechanisms using single commands for specific\n   techniques (see [links and resources for\n   detection](#links-and-resources-for-detection)) or use tools for collection\n   of a bunch of them at the same time, see [tools](#tools).\n2. Analyse the command, file hash, file signer and file path information and\n   enrich the information with more information from external services (AV\n   detection rate, correlation with other files, reputation, signer\n   information, known-bad hash check).\n3. If the output doesn't help, check the information against other clients in your\n   infrastructure: Is this entry found on other hosts too?\n4. Look for anomalies, e.g. an exe file in startup folder where normally only\n   .lnk files should be placed is suspicious or look for IP addresses or web\n   request in cronjobs. See the links below for detection ideas.\n5. In the process of the analysis it is important to note too what is NOT found\n   (evidence of absence) and not only what is found, e.g. no cron jobs were\n   found at all.\n\n### Overview of commonly used persistence mechanisms\n\nThe used techniques varies from user land persistence mechanisms, to system\nlevel persistence, from hiding behind common binary names, to putting malware\nat unusual but lesser known places. Sometimes only a proxy or other network\nconfiguration (i.a. DNS settings) changes were found after infection. Retefe used\nthe latter.\n\nUse the information from section [links and resources for\ndetection](#links-and-resources-for-detection) for specific information for\nthese techniques.\n\n#### Linux\n* Often used techniques: startup, rc and init scripts, cron jobs, shell scripts, shell profiles.\n* In-depth analysis should further include less frequently used techniques:\n  malicious libraries, loadable kernal modules (LKM), binary replacements or network scripts.\n\n#### MacOS\n* Often used techniques: launch daemons and agents, startup items, shell scripts, shell profiles.\n* In-depth analysis should further include less frequently used techniques: Dylib hijacking.\n\n#### Windows\n* Often used techniques: registry run keys, scheduled tasks, services, startup folder.\n* In-depth analysis should further include less frequently used techniques: \n  e.g. file handler hijacking (check both HKLM and HKCU), WMI implants, DLL side loading, malicious\n  drivers, LNK files, sneaky way to get persistence through RDP\n  connections on Windows is the use of image hijacks, sometimes known as\n  \"sticky keys hijacking\" or known as technique \"Accessibility Features\" in\n  the ATT\u0026CK Matrix, COM Hijacking (check both HKLM and HKCU).\n\n#### Cloud\n* [Shadow Linking: The Persistence Vector of SaaS Identity Threat](https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/shadow-linking-the-persistence-vector-of-saas-identity-threat/)\n* [Persisting on Entra ID applications and User Managed Identities with Federated Credentials](https://dirkjanm.io/persisting-with-federated-credentials-entra-apps-managed-identities/)\n* Mapping storage volumes to external storage providers.\n\n#### All OSes and developer specific changes\n* Proxy and other network configuration changes, backdoor accounts\n      and shortcut modifications.\n* Developer workstations: e.g. modified IDE software and git hook scripts.\n\n### Overview of difficult to detect persistence mechanisms\n\n* Malware which omit setting persistence at all on the victim's host but\n  reinfect the host after reboot from another system, e.g. from a DC (a\n  system which is running long time and no persistence is needed at all).\n* Persistence, e.g. through registry run keys, is only set shortly before\n  the shutdown command (shutdown command is hooked). Used in Dridex malware\n  in the past. Cool thing, if you knew that, you could cold boot the\n  computer and \"deactivate\" Dridex.\n* Abuse of hooked file handler.\n* DLL side loading (file can be anywhere on the system).\n* Legitimate binary replacement.\n* Firmware changes which then also prevents correct patching. [Example](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/06/barracuda-urges-replacing-not-patching-its-email-security-gateways/).\n\n### Persistence through UEFI malware and bootkits\n\n* (UEFI) firmware malware, bootkits or modified kernel images. These can be \n  detected by checking the signed binaries from the client (Secure Boot). See\n  [MoonBounce: the dark side of UEFI\n  firmware](https://securelist.com/moonbounce-the-dark-side-of-uefi-firmware/105468)\n  for a in depth write up about one particular UEFI bootkit.\n   * _Analysis has shown that a single component within the inspected\n     firmware’s image was modified by attackers in a way that allowed them to\n     intercept the original execution flow of the machine’s boot sequence and\n     introduce a sophisticated infection chain._\n   * See section \"Revisiting the current state of the art in persistent\n     attacks\" for a brief history of UEFI malware. From this section: _In the\n     last year, there have been several public accounts on the ongoing trend of\n     UEFI threats. Notable examples include the UEFI bootkit used as part of\n     the FinSpy surveillance toolset that we reported on, the work of our\n     colleagues from ESET on the ESPectre bootkit, and a little-known threat\n     activity that was discovered within government organisations in the Middle\n     East, using a UEFI bootkit of its own [...] MoonBounce is notable for\n     being the third publicly revealed case of an implant from the latter class\n     of firmware-based rootkits. Previous cases included LoJax and\n     MosaicRegressor, which we reported on during October 2020._\n\n### Links and resources for detection\n\nThe following resources cover a lot of persistence techniques and more\ninformation on how to detect these specific mechanisms.\n\n#### MITRE ATT\u0026CK tactic \"TA0003 - Persistence\"\n\nOne of the most comprehensive lists of persistence techniques is the list\nfound in [MITRE ATT\u0026CK tactic \"TA0003 - Persistence\"](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/).\nBesides a description, different mitigations and a detection section is provided. Furthermore, \nthe involved actors using these techniques are listed on the page.\n\nURL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/\n\n#### Hexacorn's blog persistence category\n\nA second gold mine for persistence information is found on [Hexacorn's\nblog](http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/category/autostart-persistence/) where\nregularly and since long time new techniques and blog posts about persistence\nmechanisms are published, crazy stuff. You'll also find there the legendary\nseries \"Beyond good ol’ Run key\".\n\nURL: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/category/autostart-persistence/\n\n#### theevilbit's series \"Beyond the good ol' LaunchAgents\"\n\nSeries about persistence on macOS beyond just the LaunchDaemons or \nLaunchAgents directories. In the [introduction](https://theevilbit.github.io/beyond/beyond_intro/) \nit's also refered to Pasquale Stirparo's posts ([here](https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Beyond+good+ol+LaunchAgent+part+0/24230/) and [here](https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Beyond+good+ol+LaunchAgent+part+1/24274/)) with the name\n*Beyond the good ol' LaunchAgent* from 2018.\n\nURL: https://theevilbit.github.io/tags/beyond/\n\n#### Forensic artifact repository\n\nThe [forensic artifact\nrepository](https://github.com/ForensicArtifacts/artifacts) covers different\nartifacts regarding persistence for different OSes. See yaml files for MacOS,\nLinux and Windows in the\n[data](https://github.com/ForensicArtifacts/artifacts/tree/master/data)\ndirectory.\n\nURL: https://github.com/ForensicArtifacts/artifacts\n\n#### Sigma rules\n\n[Sigma rules](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/tree/master/rules) also include\nvarious rules regarding persistence. [Search for persistence rules in Sigma\nrepository](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/search?q=persistence\u0026unscoped_q=persistence)\nor use the filter options of Sigma for either MITRE ATT\u0026CK persistence\ncategory itself or for one specific technique:\n\n```\nsigmac --recurse --filter tag=attack.persistence --target splunk --config config/splunk-windows.yml rules\n\nsigmac --recurse --filter tag=attack.t1084 --target splunk --config config/splunk-windows.yml rules\n```\n\nURL: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/search?q=persistence\u0026unscoped_q=persistence\n\n#### Autoruns\n\nYou can learn which Windows persistence mechanisms are possible by looking at\nthe output of Autoruns on your own client (see also [tools](#tools)). In the\noutput you see the categories and the different locations where things were\nfound. To see which entries Autoruns scans at all, you can start a\ndisassembler and look at the strings found in the binary, this covers only a\nsubset.\n\nURL: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902\n\nAnother way to find Windows persistence information is to look at the [PowerShell implementation of Autoruns, where the\nlocations are found in the source code]( https://github.com/p0w3rsh3ll/AutoRuns/blob/master/AutoRuns.psm1). Bonus: A [history of the covered persistence locations for each version](https://github.com/p0w3rsh3ll/AutoRuns/blob/master/AutoRuns.psm1#L2824) is found there too, which is awesome!\n\nURL:  https://github.com/p0w3rsh3ll/AutoRuns/blob/master/AutoRuns.psm1\n\n#### KnockKnock\n\nFor macOS there's the KnockKnock persistence tool to look for persistence mechanisms: https://github.com/objective-see/KnockKnock. Specific persistence locations are found in the [plugins](https://github.com/objective-see/KnockKnock/tree/main/Plugins) folder, e.g. [LaunchItems](https://github.com/objective-see/KnockKnock/blob/main/Plugins/LaunchItems.m#L21) or [StartupScripts](https://github.com/objective-see/KnockKnock/blob/main/Plugins/StartupScripts.m#L22).\n\n#### PoisonApple\n\n[PoisonApple](https://github.com/CyborgSecurity/PoisonApple/) is a command-line tool to perform various persistence mechanism techniques on macOS. This tool was designed to be used by threat hunters for cyber threat emulation purposes. Learn about various macOS persistence techniques by looking at the [source code of PoisonApple](https://github.com/CyborgSecurity/PoisonApple/blob/master/poisonapple/techniques.py).\n\n#### PANIX\n\n[Panix- Persistence Against *NIX - Features](https://github.com/Aegrah/PANIX?tab=readme-ov-file#features) is a highly customizable Linux persistence tool and includes various persistence techniques.\n\n#### Various blog posts\n\nVarious blog posts write about persistence mechanisms, some specific for one\ntechnique, others for a broader set of techniques. Here are some for the past\nyears as an inspiration what to look for.\n \nSee [How malware persists on macOS](https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/) for macOS persistence locations, General persistence mechanisms: [Common malware persistence mechanisms](https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/), [Malware persistence techniques](https://www.andreafortuna.org/2017/07/06/malware-persistence-techniques/), WMI: [Detecting \u0026 Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence](https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96), Winlogon: [Windows Persistence using WinLogon](https://www.hackingarticles.in/windows-persistence-using-winlogon/), Kovter: [Untangling Kovter’s persistence methods](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/07/untangling-kovter/), [Threat Spotlight: Kovter Malware Fileless Persistence Mechanism](https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/threat-spotlight-kovter-malware-fileless-persistence-mechanism.html), GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Hijacks: [Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options – Hidden from Autoruns.exe](https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/), Bootloader persistence: [Uncovering a MyKings Variant With Bootloader Persistence via Managed Detection and Response](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/uncovering-a-mykings-variant-with-bootloader-persistence-via-managed-detection-and-response/), COM hijacking / CLSID hijacking: [gdatasoftware writeup from 2014](https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence) or [pentestlab writeup from 2020](https://pentestlab.blog/2020/05/20/persistence-com-hijacking/) or [Enigma0x3 / Matt Nelson's writeup from 2016 abusing com hijacking in combination with scheduled tasks](https://enigma0x3.net/2016/05/25/userland-persistence-with-scheduled-tasks-and-com-handler-hijacking/), Linux cron: [Linux Malware Persistence with Cron](https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/linux-malware-persistence-with-cron/), Microsoft Exchange and Outlook: [Hunting for persistence via Microsoft Exchange Server or Outlook](https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook), [Shadow Linking: The Persistence Vector of SaaS Identity Threat](https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/shadow-linking-the-persistence-vector-of-saas-identity-threat/), [Linux Detection Engineering -  A primer on persistence mechanisms](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms), [Linux LKM Persistence - Rootkit leveraging Linux loadable kernel module (LKM)](https://righteousit.com/2024/11/18/linux-lkm-persistence/).\n\n### Examples\n\n#### MITRE ATT\u0026CK persistence technique called Local Job Scheduling\n\nIn the list from the [tactic's\npage](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/), we can navigate to the\ntechnique itself, namely [T1168 - local job\nscheduling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168/) and get the\ndescription and the needed information about the involved tools and files:\n\n\u003e On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, at, and launchd.\n\u003e\n\u003e [...]\n\u003e\n\u003e System-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files.\n\nFurther below the detection ideas are provided. Besides the process monitoring\nwe can spot malicious jobs by comparing the cron files and commands against other hosts or\njust search for unusual commands.\n\n```\n% grep -r http /etc/cron.daily/*\n```\n\nA writeup on bleepingcomputer regarding a [cryptominer on Linux](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptominer-uses-cron-to-reinfect-linux-host-after-removal/) shows an example of such a cron entry. IP changes but the persistence technique using the crontab and a web request stays. So hunt them down!\n\n#### (Ab)use of Rundll32\n\nA second example is the (ab)use of rundll32.exe to load a library through\nregistery keys or other means ([T1085 - Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085/)). \nUrsnif is one of the malware families which use a specific rundll32 command\nline since long time. Therefore, searching for registry keys containing\n\"rundll32\" and \"DllRegisterServer\" in the command line would catch it or just\nuse \"rundll32\" as a more generic search pattern.\n\nExample taken from Trendmicro's [URSNIF threat encyclopedia](https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojanspy.win32.ursnif.tiaboecq)\n\n```\nIn HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n    dminsenh = \"rundll32 \"%Application Data%\\Microsoft\\Appislad\\devrusic.dll\",DllRegisterServer\"\n```\n\n#### File handler manipulation\n\nSneaky persistence through manipulation of exefile file handler. [MITRE ATT\u0026CK T1546.001 - Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001/). [Lokibot sample from Nov 2021](https://tria.ge/211119-gs7rtshcfr/behavioral2). Check both HKLM and HKCU.\n\n```\n\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\exefile\\shell\\open\\command\\ = \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\svchost.com \\\"%1\\\" %*\"\n```\n\nand malware was dropped to `C:\\Windows\\svchost.com`.\n\n## Detection Evasion\n\nMalware authors abuse different techniques to hide their malware persistence\nor make the detection more difficult:\n* Rootkits hide files or hook registry queries\n* Use similar or typosquatted names to OS default binary names \n* Hidding entries by abusing program bugs, like the one with the null byte in registry keys which results in error while collection or just missing entries in the output of tools\n* [Abusing ADS (alternate data streams) in windows](https://argonsys.com/microsoft-cloud/library/latest-astaroth-living-off-the-land-attacks-are-even-more-invisible-but-not-less-observable/)\n* Using DLL side-loading for well-known binaries\n* Using signed binaries which then gets filtered out (depending on the analysis)\n* Hidden services when special permissions were set at service creation. Seen in section _Installation stealth and persistence_ in Talos' blog post [Threat hunting in large datasets by clustering security events](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html). This blog post references another one from SANS, [Red Team Tactics: Hiding Windows Services](https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/).\n   * _In the following steps, the script deletes PowerShell logs and registers the final payload as a Windows service using a long command line with some strange permission settings. A quick Google search reveals that these are used to make the service hidden and unremovable using the regular Windows administration tools, without some additional actions. [Talos]_\n   * _A little known feature of Windows allows the red team or an attacker to hide services from view, creating an opportunity to evade detection from common host-based threat hunting techniques. [SANS]_\n\n## Testing\n\nUse the descriptions and information from the resources in section\n[detection](#detection) to simulate the persistence.\n\nFurthermore, different tools provide checks to verify if detections work. \n\n[Atomic Red Team](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) test suite\nallows checking for specific MITRE ATT\u0026CK persistence techniques, see e.g. [T1044 \"File\nSystem Permissions\nWeakness\"](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1044/T1044.yaml).\n\n[hasherezade published demos](https://github.com/hasherezade/persistence_demos) of various \n(also non standard) persistence methods used by malware, like COM hijacking.\n\nUse [PoisonApple](https://github.com/CyborgSecurity/PoisonApple) to perform various persistence techniques on macOS.\n\nUse [PANIX](https://github.com/Aegrah/PANIX) to perform various persistence techniques against Linux systems, among others Debian and RHEL.\n\nUse [Diamorphine](https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine), a loadable kernel module (LKM) rootkit for Linux Kernels (x86/x86_64 and ARM64), to test the detection of LKMs.\n\n### Example\n\nAs an example we use the technique [T1183 - \"Image File Execution Options Injection\"](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183/) and abuse the \"sticky keys\" feature for executing a command shell. This would also be triggered before a login.\n\nTo test your collection tools, the prevention mechanisms in place and\nyour awesome detections, execute the following for adding a debugger value for the\ncorresponding registry key:\n\n```\nREG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\sethc.exe\" /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d \"cmd /c tasklist\"\n```\n\nNow you can click multiple times on the shift-key on your keyboard to trigger\nthe execution of cmd.\n\n## Response\n\nIf you respond to an incident and need to clean up malware persistence as a\ntemporary countermeasure, you just have to remove the given information. For\nfiles and configuration changes it's mostly done using standard OS commands.\nUse your EDR or some other frameworks (e.g. for Windows, see [PowerSponse](https://github.com/swisscom/PowerSponse)).\n\nIn special cases like WMI the cleanup is not as straightforward as with\nother mechanisms, see blog post [Removing Backdoors – Powershell Empire Edition](https://www.n00py.io/2017/01/removing-backdoors-powershell-empire-edition/):\n1. remove the binding using `Get-WmiObject __FilterToConsumerBinding -Namespace root\\subscription | Where-Object { $_.filter -match 'evil'} | Remove-WmiObject;`\n1. remove the event consumer using `Get-WmiObject CommandLineEventConsumer -Namespace root\\subscription -Filter \"name='evil'\" | Remove-WmiObject`\n1. remove the event filter using `Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\\Subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter \"Name='evil'\" | Remove-WmiObject -Verbose`\n\nThen there were issues with null byte values in the Windows registry and\nattackers abused that to hide entries in e.g. run keys. Custom tools or the\n[RegDelNull](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull)\ncan be used to remove these entries.\n\n## Prevention\n\nThis list is in no way comprehensive and just lists some possibilities to prevent malware persistence. The most important thing would be of course to prevent the execution of unknown programs.\n* Block file writes to unusual places if possible, e.g. public user\n    profile in Windows.\n* Block file types on specific folders where only limited file types are used\n    (e.g. .exe in startup folder where only .lnk files should be placed).\n* Use file integrity checking on important config files (e.g. cronjobs).\n* Reduce privileges so more advanced persistence techniques would fail due to\n    missing privileges.\n* File system permissions should be checked regularly and be as restricted as\n    possible.\n* Lock down configuration files (read-only) and on Windows put ACLs on\n    specific registry keys (like for the accessibility features keys).\n* Prevent the abuse of third party identity providers, see [Shadow Linking: The Persistence Vector of SaaS Identity Threat](https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/shadow-linking-the-persistence-vector-of-saas-identity-threat/).\n    \nFor macOS there's the BlockBlock tool by Patrick Wardle which provides protection by monitoring persistence locations: https://github.com/objective-see/BlockBlock.\n\n## Tools\n\nYou can either collect the needed information once on a (remote) host in case of an incident or\ncollect the information on a regular basis for baselining and threat hunting.\n\nOne thing as a reminder and thanks to Harlan Carvey over at windowsir for\npointing out similar points too in various blog posts, see [Deep Knowledge,\nand the Pursuit Thereof ](https://windowsir.blogspot.com/2019/05/deep-knowledge-and-pursuit-thereof.html)\nand [Troubleshooting and Deep\nKnowledge](https://windowsir.blogspot.com/2019/05/troubleshooting-and-deep-knowledge.html):\nBe cautious of the results of tools and try to cross check with different\ntools or check things by hand. Tools only provide you the information in their\nway and sometimes miss the malicious entry or some options were turned off\netc. Autoruns for example can hide Microsoft signed entries, but than some\nLOLbin (living-of-the-land, abusing system tools so to say) commands were\nmissing. Use it to reduce the amount of entries, but know the limits. There\nwas a null byte issue with the registry and the entries were\nmissing too in the collection. New version fixed the issue. One more: [Persistence using\nGlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options – Hidden from Autoruns.exe](https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/).\n\nFor collection of specific techniques see [links and resources for\ndetection](#links-and-resources-for-detection) which cover detailed\ninformation about the location of different persistence mechanisms.\n\n### Linux\n\n* I'm not aware of a public available tool to get a bunch of persistence mechanisms. But\n    there are different commands which can be put into a script for easier\n    usage. Depending on the distribution use the corresponding commands for\n    `crontab`, `cat`, `grep`, `md5sum`, `sha1sum`, `sha256sum`, `somethingsum`\n    and directory listings for most of the techniques.\n* [Linux Security and Monitoring Scripts](https://github.com/sqall01/LSMS) - Security and monitoring scripts you can use to monitor your Linux installation\nfor security-related events or for an investigation. Among other finding systemd unit files used for malware persistence.\n* For regular collection of persistence mechanisms you can look into [osquery](https://osquery.readthedocs.io) or [OSSEC](https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids).\n\n### MacOS\n\n* [KnockKnock](https://www.objective-see.com/products/knockknock.html)\n  uncovers persistently installed software in order to generically\n  reveal such malware. See [Github repository too for the source code](https://github.com/objective-see/KnockKnock).\n* [BlockBlock](https://github.com/objective-see/BlockBlock) provides continual protection by monitoring persistence locations.\n* [Dylib Hijack Scanner or DHS](https://www.objective-see.com/products/dhs.html), is a \n  simple utility that will scan your computer for applications that are either \n  susceptible to dylib hijacking or have been hijacked. See [Github repository too for the source code](https://github.com/objective-see/DylibHijackScanner).\n* Besides the UI tool KnockKnock, I'm not aware of a public available command line tool\n  to get a bunch of persistence mechanisms. But there are different commands which can be put\n  into a script for easier usage. Use the corresponding commands for\n  `crontab`, `cat`, `grep`, `md5sum`, `sha1sum`, `sha256sum`, `somethingsum`\n  and directory listings for most of the techniques.\n* For regular collection of persistence mechanisms you can look into\n  [osquery](https://osquery.readthedocs.io) or\n  [OSSEC](https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids).\n\n### Windows\n\n* A powerful persistence collection tool on Windows is\n  [Autoruns](http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902). It\n  collects different categories and persistence information from a live system and [in\n  limited ways from offline images](https://www.sans.org/blog/offline-autoruns-revisited-auditing-malware-persistence/). There is a UI and a command line program\n  and the output format can be set to CSV which can then be imported into your\n  log collection system of choice.\n* Instead of using CSV output and copy these file to the server, you can use\n  the script [AutorunsToWinEventLog.ps1](https://github.com/palantir/windows-event-forwarding/blob/master/AutorunsToWinEventLog/AutorunsToWinEventLog.ps1) to convert the Autoruns output to Windows event\n  logs and rely on standard Windows event log forwarding.\n* PowerShell version of [Autoruns](https://github.com/p0w3rsh3ll/AutoRuns).\n* [PersistenceSniper](https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper) is a Powershell module to hunt for persistence implanted in Windows machines.\n* [RegRipper](https://github.com/keydet89/RegRipper2.8) does also extracts\n  various persistence mechanisms from the registry files directly.\n* [RECmd](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/RECmd) using the config file [UserClassesASEPs](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/RECmd/blob/master/BatchExamples/UserClassesASEPs.reb) extracts user's CLSID information.\n* [KAPE](https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/kroll-artifact-parser-extractor-kape) has different targets and modules, see [KapeFiles](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/KapeFiles) which include persistence mechanisms, among others there's a collection of [LNK files](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/KapeFiles/blob/master/Targets/Windows/LNKFilesAndJumpLists.tkape), [scheduled task files](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/KapeFiles/blob/master/Targets/Windows/ScheduledTasks.tkape) and [scheduled task listing](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/KapeFiles/blob/master/Modules/LiveResponse/schtasks.mkape) or a [WMI repository auditing](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/KapeFiles/blob/master/Modules/LiveResponse/WMI-Repository-Auditing.mkape) module.\n* Different AVs and EDR tools also include the detection and prevention of\n  persistence mechanisms\n\n### Github topic search for persistence\n\nCurrently not many things are found with these topics, but if you search for #malware and #persistence the matched repositories are listed: https://github.com/search?q=%23malware+%23persistence\u0026type=\n\n## Acknowledgement\n\nThanks to my previous employer [Swisscom](https://www.swisscom.ch)\n([Github](https://github.com/swisscom)) for allowing me to publish the\ninformation which was inspired by my work in the past few years at the\n[@swisscom_csirt](https://twitter.com/swisscom_csirt).\n","project_url":"https://awesome.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/projects/github.com%2FKarneades%2Fmalware-persistence","html_url":"https://awesome.ecosyste.ms/projects/github.com%2FKarneades%2Fmalware-persistence","lists_url":"https://awesome.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/projects/github.com%2FKarneades%2Fmalware-persistence/lists"}