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It discovers, validates, and confirms DLL hijacking opportunities using a multi-phase pipeline:\n\n1. **Discovery** — Enumerates binaries across services, scheduled tasks, startup items, COM objects, and AutoElevate UAC bypass vectors\n2. **Filtration** — Eliminates false positives through intelligent hard and soft gates\n3. **Canary Confirmation** — Deploys a harmless canary DLL and triggers the binary to prove the hijack works\n4. **Scoring \u0026 Reporting** — Ranks findings by exploitability with a tiered confidence system\n\n\u003e Most DLL hijacking tools stop at “this DLL might be hijackable.” DLLHijackHunter attempts to validate it, cross-reference it against known exploit intelligence, and confirm real execution paths where possible.\n\n---\n\n## Architecture\n\n```mermaid\nflowchart TB\n    subgraph Phase1[\"Phase 1: Discovery\"]\n        SE[\"Static Engine\u003cbr/\u003eServices, Tasks, Startup,\u003cbr/\u003eCOM, Run Keys\"]\n        AE[\"AutoElevate Engine\u003cbr/\u003eManifest + COM UAC Bypass\"]\n        PE[\"PE Analyzer\u003cbr/\u003eImport Tables, Delay Loads,\u003cbr/\u003eManifests, Exports\"]\n        ETW[\"ETW Engine\u003cbr/\u003eReal-time DLL Load\u003cbr/\u003eMonitoring\"]\n        SO[\"Search Order\u003cbr/\u003eCalculator\"]\n    end\n\n    subgraph Phase2[\"Phase 2: Filter Pipeline\"]\n        direction LR\n        HG[\"Hard Gates\u003cbr/\u003e(Binary Kill)\"]\n        SG[\"Soft Gates\u003cbr/\u003e(Confidence Adj.)\"]\n    end\n\n    subgraph Phase3[\"Phase 3: Canary\"]\n        CB[\"Canary DLL Builder\"]\n        TE[\"Trigger Executor\"]\n        VF[\"Verification\"]\n    end\n\n    subgraph Phase4[\"Phase 4: Output\"]\n        SC[\"Tiered Scorer\"]\n        RC[\"Console Report\"]\n        RJ[\"JSON Report\"]\n        RH[\"HTML Report\"]\n    end\n\n    SE --\u003e PE --\u003e SO\n    AE --\u003e PE\n    ETW --\u003e SO\n    SO --\u003e Phase2\n    HG --\u003e SG\n    Phase2 --\u003e Phase3\n    CB --\u003e TE --\u003e VF\n    Phase3 --\u003e Phase4\n```\n\n---\n\n## Key Features\n\n### Hijack Type Coverage\n\n| Type | Description | Stealth |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Phantom** | DLL doesn't exist anywhere on disk | High |\n| **Search Order** | Place DLL earlier in the Windows search order | High |\n| **Side-Loading** | Abuse legitimate app loading DLLs from its directory | High |\n| **.local Redirect** | Hijack via `.local` directory redirection | High |\n| **KnownDLL Bypass** | Attempt bypass via `.local` or WoW64 edge cases | Medium |\n| **ENV PATH** | Weaponization of writable directories in system `PATH` | High |\n| **CWD** | Current Working Directory hijack | Low |\n| **AppInit DLLs** | `AppInit_DLLs` registry abuse | Low |\n| **IFEO** | Image File Execution Options debugger abuse | Medium |\n| **AppCert DLLs** | `AppCertDLLs` registry hijack | Low |\n\n### UAC Bypass Discovery\n\nDLLHijackHunter includes dedicated UAC bypass discovery:\n\n- **Manifest AutoElevate** — Scans `System32` and `SysWOW64` for EXEs with `\u003cautoElevate\u003etrue\u003c/autoElevate\u003e` in embedded manifests\n- **COM AutoElevation** — Scans `HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID` for COM objects with `Elevation\\Enabled=1`\n- **Side-Load Simulation** — For AutoElevate binaries that do not call `SetDllDirectory` or `SetDefaultDllDirectories`, simulates the “copy EXE to writable folder + drop DLL” attack path\n\n### Targeted Vulnerability Knowledge Base\n\n- **Targeted vulnerability mapping** — Cross-references discovered imports against an offline dictionary of known vulnerable software patterns (for example, HijackLibs-style matches)\n- **Automated PATH exploitation** — Evaluates writable `PATH` folders and generates hijack candidates for native Windows services that search `PATH` for missing DLLs\n- **Expanded phantom DLL hunting** — Searches for a broad library of high-value phantom DLL opportunities across multiple categories\n\n### Filter Pipeline\n\nThe pipeline reduces false positives through two stages:\n\n**Hard Gates**\n- API set schema filtering (`api-ms-*`, `ext-ms-*`)\n- KnownDLL filtering\n- ACL-based writability validation\n\n**Soft Gates**\n- WinSxS manifest penalty\n- Privilege delta analysis\n- `LoadLibraryEx` mitigation checks\n- Signature validation checks\n- Graceful error-handling penalties\n\n---\n\n## Canary Confirmation\n\nInstead of guessing, DLLHijackHunter attempts to prove hijacks work:\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n    participant H as DLLHijackHunter\n    participant B as Canary DLL Builder\n    participant T as Trigger Executor\n    participant V as Victim Binary\n\n    H-\u003e\u003eB: Build canary DLL\n    B-\u003e\u003eB: Compile with MSVC (cl.exe)\n    B--\u003e\u003eH: canary.dll + confirmation file path\n    H-\u003e\u003eH: Place DLL at hijack path\n    H-\u003e\u003eT: Trigger binary execution\n    T-\u003e\u003eV: Start service / run task / COM activate\n    V-\u003e\u003eV: Loads canary DLL\n    V--\u003e\u003eH: Writes confirmation file\u003cbr/\u003ePID, privilege, integrity level\n    H-\u003e\u003eH: Record: CONFIRMED\n    H-\u003e\u003eH: Cleanup canary DLL\n```\n\nThe canary DLL:\n- Is built with **MSVC (`cl.exe`)**\n- Uses a **file-based confirmation mechanism**\n- Captures execution metadata such as user, integrity level, and privilege indicators\n- Contains no malicious payload; it is strictly a detection and validation mechanism\n\n### Important note on proxy/export-forwarding mode\n\nProxy/export-forwarding canaries are **experimental** and **best-effort**. Some targets may fail to load correctly or may behave unexpectedly depending on:\n\n- ordinal-only exports\n- decorated export names\n- calling convention mismatches\n- loader/runtime assumptions in the target process\n\nThat means a failed proxy canary does **not always** mean the underlying hijack path is impossible.\n\n---\n\n## Comparison\n\n| Feature | **DLLHijackHunter** | Robber | DLLSpy | WinPEAS | Procmon |\n|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|\n| Automated discovery | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |\n| Phantom DLL detection | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| Search order analysis | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| ACL-based writability check | ✅ | Partial | ❌ | Basic | ❌ |\n| ETW real-time monitoring | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| Canary confirmation | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| Privilege escalation check | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| UAC bypass discovery | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| False positive reduction | ✅ | None | Basic | None | None |\n| Reboot persistence check | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| Proxy DLL generation | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| Confidence scoring | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| Auto trigger (svc/task/COM) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| HTML/JSON reporting | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | TXT | ❌ |\n| Threat intel correlation | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| Automated PATH exploits | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |\n| Target-specific scanning | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |\n| Self-contained binary | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |\n\n---\n\n## Usage\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- **Windows 10/11** or **Windows Server 2016+**\n- **.NET 8.0 Runtime** (or use a self-contained build)\n- **Administrator privileges** recommended (required for ETW, canary deployment, and some service triggers)\n\n### Build\n\n```powershell\ngit clone https://github.com/ghostvectoracademy/DLLHijackHunter.git\ncd DLLHijackHunter\n\n# Build (self-contained single file)\ndotnet publish src/DLLHijackHunter/DLLHijackHunter.csproj `\n    -c Release -r win-x64 --self-contained `\n    -p:PublishSingleFile=true -o ./publish\n\n# Or use the build script\n.\\build.ps1\n```\n\n### Quick Start\n\n```powershell\n# Full aggressive scan (recommended, requires admin)\n.\\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile aggressive\n\n# Safe scan (no file drops, no triggers)\n.\\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile safe\n\n# UAC bypass focused scan\n.\\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile uac-bypass\n\n# Target a specific binary\n.\\DLLHijackHunter.exe --target \"C:\\Program Files\\MyApp\\app.exe\"\n\n# Target by filename (partial match)\n.\\DLLHijackHunter.exe --target notepad.exe\n\n# Confirmed findings only\n.\\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile redteam --format json -o report.json\n```\n\n### CLI Options\n\n```text\nDLLHijackHunter — Automated DLL Hijacking Detection\n\nOptions:\n  -p, --profile \u003cprofile\u003e        Scan profile [default: aggressive]\n                                   aggressive | strict | safe | redteam | uac-bypass\n  -o, --output \u003cpath\u003e            Output file path (auto-detects format)\n  -f, --format \u003cformat\u003e          Output format [default: console]\n                                   console | json | html\n  -t, --target \u003ctarget\u003e          Target specific binary, directory, or filename\n      --min-confidence \u003cvalue\u003e   Minimum confidence threshold 0-100 [default: 20]\n      --no-canary                Disable canary confirmation\n      --no-etw                   Disable ETW runtime discovery\n      --confirmed-only           Only show canary-confirmed findings\n  -v, --verbose                  Verbose output\n```\n\n### Scan Profiles\n\n| Profile | Use Case | Canary | ETW | UAC Bypass | Min Confidence | Triggers |\n|---|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|---|\n| **aggressive** | Full audit, lab environments | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | 15% | Services, Tasks, COM |\n| **strict** | High-confidence findings only | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | 80% | Services, Tasks |\n| **safe** | Production systems, read-only | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | 50% | None |\n| **redteam** | Confirmed exploitable only | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | 50% | Services, Tasks, COM |\n| **uac-bypass** | UAC bypass vectors only | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | 20% | AutoElevate only |\n\n---\n\n## Scoring\n\nEach finding receives confidence and impact signals that are combined into a final prioritization tier.\n\nTypical impact considerations include:\n- privilege gained\n- trigger reliability\n- stealth\n- reboot persistence\n\nConfirmed canary execution should be treated as the strongest validation signal.\n\n---\n\n## Safety\n\nDLLHijackHunter is designed for defensive security research, lab validation, auditing, and red-team simulation in authorized environments.\n\nUse it only on systems and networks you own or are explicitly authorized to assess.\n\n### Operational notes\n\n- Canary mode writes test DLLs to candidate locations\n- Some triggers may briefly start or stop services/tasks during validation\n- Proxy/export-forwarding canaries may destabilize fragile targets\n- Safe profile is the preferred mode for production triage when file drops and triggers are not acceptable\n\n---\n\n## Output\n\nDLLHijackHunter supports:\n- console reporting\n- JSON export\n- HTML export\n\nRecommended workflow:\n1. run a broad scan\n2. review high-confidence findings\n3. use canary confirmation selectively on high-value paths\n4. preserve JSON/HTML output for reporting and triage\n\n---\n\n## License\n\nMIT\n\n---\n\n## Credits\n\nBuilt by **GhostVector Academy**.\n","project_url":"https://awesome.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/projects/github.com%2Fghostvectoracademy%2Fdllhijackhunter","html_url":"https://awesome.ecosyste.ms/projects/github.com%2Fghostvectoracademy%2Fdllhijackhunter","lists_url":"https://awesome.ecosyste.ms/api/v1/projects/github.com%2Fghostvectoracademy%2Fdllhijackhunter/lists"}