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https://github.com/controlplaneio/kubectl-kubesec

Security risk analysis for Kubernetes resources
https://github.com/controlplaneio/kubectl-kubesec

Last synced: 2 months ago
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Security risk analysis for Kubernetes resources

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# kubectl-kubesec



[![Build Status](https://travis-ci.org/controlplaneio/kubectl-kubesec.svg?branch=master)](https://travis-ci.org/controlplaneio/kubectl-kubesec)



This is a kubectl plugin for scanning Kubernetes pods, deployments, daemonsets and statefulsets with [kubesec.io](https://kubesec.io). By default the plugin will send scan requests to the hosted version of [kubesec.io](https://kubesec.io). However, it is also possible to self host the scanning service and use that for scanning instead.



For the admission controller see [kubesec-webhook](https://github.com/controlplaneio/kubesec-webhook)



The latest release of this plugin is fully compatible with the API version V2 of kubesec documented at [kubesec.io](https://kubesec.io).



#### Install with krew



1. [Install krew](https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/krew) plugin manager

   for kubectl.

2. Run `kubectl krew install kubesec-scan`.

3. Start using by running `kubectl kubesec-scan`.



#### Install with curl



For Kubernetes 1.12 or newer:



```bash

mkdir -p ~/.kube/plugins/scan && \

curl -sL https://github.com/controlplaneio/kubectl-kubesec/releases/download/1.0.0/kubectl-kubesec_1.0.0_`uname -s`_amd64.tar.gz | tar xzvf - -C ~/.kube/plugins/scan

mv ~/.kube/plugins/scan/scan ~/.kube/plugins/scan/kubectl-scan

export PATH=$PATH:~/.kube/plugins/scan

```



For Kubernetes older than 1.12:



```bash

mkdir -p ~/.kube/plugins/scan && \

curl -sL https://github.com/controlplaneio/kubectl-kubesec/releases/download/0.3.1/kubectl-kubesec_0.3.1_`uname -s`_amd64.tar.gz | tar xzvf - -C ~/.kube/plugins/scan

```



### Usage



By default the plugin uses the hosted version of [kubesec.io](https://kubesec.io). However, you can run the hosted service locally. For example using docker:



```bash

## 

docker run -d -p 8080:8080 kubesec/kubesec:v2 http 8080

```



Scan a Deployment:



```bash

kubectl kubesec-scan -n kube-system deployment kubernetes-dashboard

# if you are running a self hosted version of kubese.io using docker then:

kubectl kubesec-scan -n kube-system deployment kubernetes-dashboard --url http://localhost:8080

```



Result:



```bash

kubernetes-dashboard kubesec.io score 7

-----------------

Advise

1. containers[] .securityContext .runAsNonRoot == true

Force the running image to run as a non-root user to ensure least privilege

2. containers[] .securityContext .capabilities .drop

Reducing kernel capabilities available to a container limits its attack surface

3. containers[] .securityContext .readOnlyRootFilesystem == true

An immutable root filesystem can prevent malicious binaries being added to PATH and increase attack cost

4. containers[] .securityContext .runAsUser > 10000

Run as a high-UID user to avoid conflicts with the host's user table

5. containers[] .securityContext .capabilities .drop | index("ALL")

Drop all capabilities and add only those required to reduce syscall attack surface

```



Scan a DaemonSet:



```bash

kubectl kubesec-scan -n weave daemonset weave-scope-agent

# if you are running a self hosted version of kubese.io using then:

kubectl kubesec-scan -n weave daemonset weave-scope-agent --url http://localhost:8080

```



Result:



```bash

daemonset/weave-scope-agent kubesec.io score -54

-----------------

Critical

1. containers[] .securityContext .privileged == true

Privileged containers can allow almost completely unrestricted host access

2. .spec .hostNetwork

Sharing the host's network namespace permits processes in the pod to communicate with processes bound to the host's loopback adapter

3. .spec .hostPID

Sharing the host's PID namespace allows visibility of processes on the host, potentially leaking information such as environment variables and configuration

4. .spec .volumes[] .hostPath .path == "/var/run/docker.sock"

Mounting the docker.socket leaks information about other containers and can allow container breakout

```



Scan a StatefulSet:



```bash

kubectl kubesec-scan statefulset memcached

# if you are running a self hosted version of kubese.io then:

kubectl kubesec-scan statefulset memcached --url http://localhost:8080

```



Result:



```bash

statefulset/memcached kubesec.io score 2

-----------------

Advise

1. .spec .volumeClaimTemplates[] .spec .accessModes | index("ReadWriteOnce")

2. containers[] .securityContext .runAsNonRoot == true

Force the running image to run as a non-root user to ensure least privilege

3. containers[] .securityContext .capabilities .drop

Reducing kernel capabilities available to a container limits its attack surface

4. containers[] .securityContext .readOnlyRootFilesystem == true

An immutable root filesystem can prevent malicious binaries being added to PATH and increase attack cost

5. containers[] .securityContext .runAsUser > 10000

Run as a high-UID user to avoid conflicts with the host's user table

```



Scan a Pod:



```bash

kubectl kubesec-scan -n kube-system pod tiller-deploy-5c688d5f9b-ztjbt

# if you are running a self hosted version of kubese.io then:

kubectl kubesec-scan -n kube-system pod tiller-deploy-5c688d5f9b-ztjbt --url http://localhost:8080 

```



Result:



```bash

pod/tiller-deploy-5c688d5f9b-ztjbt kubesec.io score 3

-----------------

Advise

1. containers[] .securityContext .runAsNonRoot == true

Force the running image to run as a non-root user to ensure least privilege

2. containers[] .securityContext .capabilities .drop

Reducing kernel capabilities available to a container limits its attack surface

3. containers[] .securityContext .readOnlyRootFilesystem == true

An immutable root filesystem can prevent malicious binaries being added to PATH and increase attack cost

4. containers[] .securityContext .runAsUser > 10000

Run as a high-UID user to avoid conflicts with the host's user table

5. containers[] .securityContext .capabilities .drop | index("ALL")

Drop all capabilities and add only those required to reduce syscall attack surface

```