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https://github.com/Yu-Fangxu/COLD-Attack
[ICML 2024] COLD-Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs with Stealthiness and Controllability
https://github.com/Yu-Fangxu/COLD-Attack
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[ICML 2024] COLD-Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs with Stealthiness and Controllability
- Host: GitHub
- URL: https://github.com/Yu-Fangxu/COLD-Attack
- Owner: Yu-Fangxu
- Created: 2024-02-08T15:33:36.000Z (10 months ago)
- Default Branch: main
- Last Pushed: 2024-09-15T02:13:29.000Z (3 months ago)
- Last Synced: 2024-09-15T08:05:23.259Z (3 months ago)
- Language: Python
- Homepage:
- Size: 7.13 MB
- Stars: 83
- Watchers: 4
- Forks: 15
- Open Issues: 1
-
Metadata Files:
- Readme: README.md
Awesome Lists containing this project
- awesome-MLSecOps - COLD-Attack
README
# COLD-Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs with Stealthiness and Controllability
We study the **controllable** jailbreaks on large language models (LLMs). Specifically, we focus on how to enforce control on LLM attacks. In this work, we formally formulate the controllable attack generation problem, and build a novel connection between this problem and controllable text generation, a well-explored topic of natural language processing. Based on this connection, we adapt the [Energy-based Constrained Decoding with Langevin Dynamics (COLD)](https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2022/hash/3e25d1aff47964c8409fd5c8dc0438d7-Abstract-Conference.html), a state-of-the-art, highly efficient algorithm in controllable text generation, and introduce the COLD-Attack framework which unifies and automates the search of adversarial LLM attacks under a variety of control requirements such as fluency, stealthiness, sentiment, and left-right-coherence. The controllability enabled by COLD-Attack leads to diverse new jailbreak scenarios including:
1. Fluent suffix attacks (standard attack setting which append the adversarial prompt to the original malicious user query).
2. Paraphrase attack with and without sentiment steering (revising a user query adversarially with minimal paraphrasing).
3. Attack with left-right-coherence (inserting stealthy attacks in context with left-right-coherence).More details can be found in our paper:
Xingang Guo*, Fangxu Yu*, Huan Zhang, Lianhui Qin, Bin Hu, "[COLD-Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs with Stealthiness and Controllability](https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08679)" (* Equal contribution)## COLD-Attack
![plot](./imgs/COLD_attack_diagram.png)
As illustrated in the above diagram, our COLD-Attack framework includes three main steps:
1. **Energy function formulation**: specify energy functions properly to capture the attack constraints such as fluency, stealthiness, sentiment, and left-right-coherence.
2. **Langevin dynamics sampling**: run Langevin dynamics recursively for $N$ steps to obtain a good energy-based model governing the adversarial attack logits $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}^N$.
3. **Decoding process**: leverage an LLM-guided decoding process to covert the continuous logit $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}^N$ into discrete text attacks $\mathbf{y}$.## Selected Examples
Here are some examples that generated by COLD-Attack:![plot](./imgs/selected_samples_2.png)
## Jailbreaking Performance
We evaluate the performance of COLD-Attack on four popular white-box LLMs: Vicuna-7b-v1.5 (Vicuna), Llama-2-7b-Chat-hf (Llama2), Guanaco-7b (Guanaco), and Mistral-7b-Instruct-v0.2 (Mistral). In addition, we use the following three main evaluation metrics:
1. Attack Successful Rate (**ASR**): the percentage of instructions that elicit corresponding harmful outputs using sub-string matching method.
2. GPT-4 based ASR (**ASR-G**): We develop a prompt template and utilize GPT-4 to assess whether a response accurately fulfills the malicious instruction. Based on our observations, ASR-G has shown higher correlation with human annotations, providing a more reliable measure of attack effectiveness.
3. Perplexity (**PPL**): We use PPL to evaluate the fluency of the generated prompts and use Vicuna-7b to do the PPL calculation.To ensure the generated adversarial prompts meet specific criteria, we apply controls over various features, including sentiment and vocabulary. We evaluate how well these controls work using a metric called **Succ**, which represents the percentage of samples that successfully adhere to our set requirements. Additionally, a range of NLP-related evaluation metrics including **BERTScore**, **BLEU**, and **ROUGE** are applied to evaluate the quality of generated controllable attacks.
### Fluent suffix attack
| Models | ASR ↑ | ASR-G ↑ | PPL ↓ |
|----------|--------|---------|-------|
| Vicuna | 100.0 | 86.00 | 32.96 |
| Guanaco | 96.00 | 84.00 | 30.55 |
| Mistral | 92.00 | 90.00 | 26.24 |
| Llama2 | 92.00 | 66.00 | 24.83 |### Paraphrase attack
| Models | ASR ↑ | ASR-G ↑ | PPL ↓ | BLEU ↑ | ROUGE ↑ | BERTScore ↑ |
|----------|--------|---------|-------|--------|---------|--------------|
| Vicuna | 96.00 | 80.00 | 31.11 | 0.52 | 0.57 | 0.72 |
| Guanaco | 98.00 | 78.00 | 29.23 | 0.47 | 0.55 | 0.74 |
| Mistral | 98.00 | 90.00 | 37.21 | 0.41 | 0.55 | 0.72 |
| Llama2 | 86.00 | 74.00 | 39.26 | 0.60 | 0.54 | 0.71 |### Left-right-coherence control
| Models | ASR ↑ | ASR-G ↑ | Succ ↑ | PPL ↓ |
|-------------------------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| **Sentiment Constraint**| | | | |
| Vicuna | 90.00 | 96.00 | 84.00 | 66.48 |
| Guanaco | 96.00 | 94.00 | 82.00 | 74.05 |
| Mistral | 92.00 | 96.00 | 92.00 | 67.61 |
| Llama2 | 80.00 | 88.00 | 64.00 | 59.53 |
| **Lexical Constraint** | | | | |
| Vicuna | 92.00 | 100.00 | 82.00 | 76.69 |
| Guanaco | 92.00 | 96.00 | 82.00 | 99.03 |
| Mistral | 94.00 | 84.00 | 92.00 | 96.06 |
| Llama2 | 88.00 | 86.00 | 68.00 | 68.23 |
| **Format Constraint** | | | | |
| Vicuna | 92.00 | 94.00 | 88.00 | 67.63 |
| Guanaco | 92.00 | 94.00 | 72.00 | 72.97 |
| Mistral | 94.00 | 86.00 | 84.00 | 44.56 |
| Llama2 | 80.00 | 86.00 | 72.00 | 57.70 |
| **Style Constraint** | | | | |
| Vicuna | 94.00 | 96.00 | 80.00 | 81.54 |
| Guanaco | 94.00 | 92.00 | 70.00 | 75.25 |
| Mistral | 92.00 | 90.00 | 86.00 | 54.50 |
| Llama2 | 80.00 | 80.00 | 68.00 | 58.93 |Please see more detaieled evaluation results and discussions in our paper.
## Code
**1) Download this GitHub**
```
git clone https://github.com/Yu-Fangxu/COLD-Attack.git
```**2) Setup Environment**
We recommend conda for setting up a reproducible experiment environment.
We include `environment.yaml` for creating a working environment:```bash
conda env create -f environment.yaml -n cold-attack
```You will then need to setup NLTK and hugging face:
```bash
conda activate cold-attack
python3 -c "import nltk; nltk.download('stopwords', 'averaged_perceptron_tagger', 'punkt'); "
```To run the Llama-2 model, you will need to [request access](https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-chat-hf)
at Hugging face and setup account login:```bash
huggingface-cli login --token [Your Hugging face token]
```**3) Run Command for COLD-Attack**
* Fluent suffix attack
```
bash attack.sh "suffix"
```* Paraphrase attack
```
bash attack.sh "paraphrase"
```* Left-right-coherence control
```
bash attack.sh "control"
```
**If you find our repository helpful to your research, please consider citing:**
```
@article{guo2024cold,
title={Cold-attack: Jailbreaking llms with stealthiness and controllability},
author={Guo, Xingang and Yu, Fangxu and Zhang, Huan and Qin, Lianhui and Hu, Bin},
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08679},
year={2024}
}
```
```
@article{qin2022cold,
title={Cold decoding: Energy-based constrained text generation with langevin dynamics},
author={Qin, Lianhui and Welleck, Sean and Khashabi, Daniel and Choi, Yejin},
journal={Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems},
volume={35},
pages={9538--9551},
year={2022}
}
```