https://github.com/ashlrai/binshield
Snyk for binaries. Ghidra-backed decompile + AI classification + YARA for npm supply-chain threats. MIT.
https://github.com/ashlrai/binshield
ai ghidra malware-detection npm security supply-chain yara
Last synced: 16 days ago
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Snyk for binaries. Ghidra-backed decompile + AI classification + YARA for npm supply-chain threats. MIT.
- Host: GitHub
- URL: https://github.com/ashlrai/binshield
- Owner: ashlrai
- Created: 2026-03-21T21:52:38.000Z (4 months ago)
- Default Branch: main
- Last Pushed: 2026-05-15T22:41:26.000Z (about 2 months ago)
- Last Synced: 2026-05-16T00:59:32.558Z (about 2 months ago)
- Topics: ai, ghidra, malware-detection, npm, security, supply-chain, yara
- Language: TypeScript
- Homepage: https://binary-scanner.vercel.app
- Size: 2.71 MB
- Stars: 2
- Watchers: 0
- Forks: 0
- Open Issues: 0
-
Metadata Files:
- Readme: README.md
Awesome Lists containing this project
README
# BinShield
**Catch malicious install scripts and native binaries in your dependencies — before they reach production.**
[](https://github.com/ashlrai/binshield/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
[](LICENSE)
BinShield is a supply-chain security platform for the npm and PyPI ecosystems.
It analyzes the two things attackers actually weaponize — **install scripts**
and **native binaries** — classifies their behavior with AI, cross-references
known-malware feeds, and warns you the moment a package you depend on turns
malicious.
🌐 **[binshield.dev](https://binshield.dev)** · 🔌 **[GitHub Action](apps/github-action/README.md)** · 📖 **[Docs](docs/)**
## The problem
A wave of supply-chain worms — Shai-Hulud and its kin — has shown how fast a
single compromised npm/PyPI package spreads. Two attack surfaces matter:
- **Install scripts.** A malicious `postinstall` hook (or a PyPI `setup.py`)
runs arbitrary code on every machine that installs the package — stealing
`NPM_TOKEN`/cloud credentials, opening reverse shells, dropping wipers.
Most SCA tools never read the `scripts` field.
- **Native binaries.** Compiled `.node`/`.so`/`.dylib`/`.wasm` addons hide
payloads that no source-level scanner decompiles.
BinShield covers both.
## What BinShield does
| Capability | Detail |
|---|---|
| **Install-script analysis** | Scans npm lifecycle hooks (`preinstall`/`install`/`postinstall`/`prepare`) and PyPI `setup.py`/`pyproject.toml` for `curl\|bash`, `eval` of remote code, credential exfiltration, wipers, reverse shells, and obfuscated payloads. |
| **Native binary analysis** | Ghidra-powered decompilation (with a heuristic fallback) plus YARA pattern matching on `.node`/`.so`/`.dylib`/`.wasm`. |
| **AI classification** | xAI Grok classifies decompiled binaries and install scripts into a supply-chain threat taxonomy; a deterministic heuristic floor runs when AI is unavailable. |
| **Known-malware feed** | Cross-references every scan against OSV malicious-package advisories (`MAL-*`); a confirmed match forces a critical verdict. |
| **Proactive alerts** | When a malicious package is discovered, BinShield matches it against your watchlists and scanned lockfiles and alerts you via email / Slack / webhook. |
| **CI gating** | A GitHub Action scans every PR's dependencies and blocks merges on risky packages. |
| **Reports** | CycloneDX SBOM export and SOC 2 / ISO 27001 / EU CRA compliance reports. |
## Architecture
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph Sources
A[API / Dashboard scan] --> Q
F[npm registry feed] --> Q
C[Crawler / discovery] --> Q
end
Q[analysis_jobs queue] --> W
subgraph W[Analysis worker]
direction TB
AC[Acquire package] --> EX[Extract binaries]
AC --> MS[Install-script analysis]
EX --> DC[Decompile + YARA]
DC --> CL[AI classify]
MS --> CL
CL --> RS[Risk score + malware feed]
end
RS --> DB[(Supabase)]
RS --> AL[Alert loop]
DB --> WEB[Web app]
DB --> ACT[GitHub Action]
AL --> N[Email / Slack / Webhook]
```
## Quickstart
```bash
corepack enable # provides pnpm 10
pnpm install
pnpm dev # web app at http://localhost:3000
```
BinShield ships a **demo fallback** — the web app, API, and worker all run
without live credentials (seeded corpus, in-memory store, bundled fixtures),
so you can explore the product before wiring up Supabase / xAI / Stripe.
```bash
pnpm --filter @binshield/api dev # API server
BINSHIELD_WORKER_MODE=daemon pnpm --filter @binshield/worker dev # worker
pnpm typecheck && pnpm test && pnpm build # the validation gate
```
## Scan your repo in CI
Add the GitHub Action to block malicious dependencies on every PR:
```yaml
- uses: ashlrai/binshield/apps/github-action@v1
with:
api-key: ${{ secrets.BINSHIELD_API_KEY }}
fail-on: high
```
See [`apps/github-action/README.md`](apps/github-action/README.md) for inputs,
scan modes, and SBOM export.
## Monorepo layout
| Path | Description |
|---|---|
| `apps/web` | Next.js 15 frontend — public package database and dashboard |
| `apps/api` | Hono API — search, scans, orgs, advisories, billing |
| `apps/worker` | Analysis worker — binary + install-script pipeline, feed, crawler |
| `apps/github-action` | CI scanner that gates PRs on dependency risk |
| `apps/video` | Remotion project for the demo video |
| `packages/analysis-types` | Shared domain types and sample data |
| `packages/risk-engine` | Deterministic risk scoring |
| `packages/config` | Environment parsing and product constants |
| `packages/ui` | Shared UI components |
| `packages/cli` | Command-line entry points |
## Documentation
- [Architecture](docs/architecture.md)
- [API reference](docs/api-reference.md)
- [Integration guide](docs/integration-guide.md)
- [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [Security policy](SECURITY.md) · [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md)
## License
MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).