https://github.com/danilofreire/climate-governance
Replication materials for the paper "Institutional Design and Elite Support for Climate Policies: Evidence from Latin American Countries" (2020)
https://github.com/danilofreire/climate-governance
climate-governance latin-america survey-experiment
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Replication materials for the paper "Institutional Design and Elite Support for Climate Policies: Evidence from Latin American Countries" (2020)
- Host: GitHub
- URL: https://github.com/danilofreire/climate-governance
- Owner: danilofreire
- Created: 2019-05-10T05:03:59.000Z (almost 6 years ago)
- Default Branch: master
- Last Pushed: 2020-07-26T06:32:30.000Z (almost 5 years ago)
- Last Synced: 2024-12-25T18:12:01.520Z (4 months ago)
- Topics: climate-governance, latin-america, survey-experiment
- Language: TeX
- Homepage: https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.19
- Size: 4.86 MB
- Stars: 1
- Watchers: 3
- Forks: 0
- Open Issues: 0
-
Metadata Files:
- Readme: README.md
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README
## Institutional Design and Elite Support for Climate Policies: Evidence from Latin American Countries
This GitHub repository contains data and documented R code for ["Institutional Design and Elite Support for Climate Policies: Evidence from Latin American Countries"](https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.19), authored by [Danilo Freire](http://danilofreire.github.io), [Umberto Mignozzetti](http://umbertomig.com), and [David Skarbek](http://davidskarbek.com). The article has been published at the [Journal of Experimental Political Science](https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.19).
> **Abstract**: Which institutional features do Latin American elites favor for local climate change policies? Climate change mitigation requires active local level implementation, but it remains unclear which institutional arrangements maximize support for environmental rules. In this paper, we run a conjoint experiment with elite members of 10 Latin American countries and ask respondents to evaluate institutional designs drawn from a pool of 5,500 possible local climate governance arrangements. We find that Latin American elites prefer international organizations to formulate climate policies, support imposing increasing fines on violators, and favor renewing agreements every five years. We also find that elites support both international institutions and local courts to mediate conflicts, but they distrust non-governmental organizations and reject informal norms as a means of conflict resolution. Our results identify possible challenges in crafting local climate mitigation policies and offer new insights about how to integrate local and international levels in environmental agreements.
>
> **Keywords**: climate change, elites, institutional design, Latin America, regime complex
You can cite the article as:
> Freire, D., Mignozzetti, U., Skarbek, D. 2020. "Institutional Design and Elite Support for Climate Policies: Evidence from Latin American Countries", _Journal of Experimental Political Science_, 1-13, DOI: .
BibTeX entry:
```
@article{freire_mignozzetti_skarbek_2020,
title={Institutional Design and Elite Support for Climate Policies: Evidence from Latin American Countries},
author={Freire, Danilo and Mignozzetti, Umberto and Skarbek, David},
journal={Journal of Experimental Political Science},
publisher={Cambridge University Press},
year={2020},
pages={1–13},
DOI={10.1017/XPS.2020.19}
}
```