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https://github.com/fmxsh/tot-ontology

A root meta-ontology.
https://github.com/fmxsh/tot-ontology

concept ontology philosophy

Last synced: 7 months ago
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A root meta-ontology.

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> [!NOTE]

> This is under development. Most recent comes under first level-1 heading.



Suggested category: Functional Post-Structural Ontological Minimalism, Emergent Structural Functionalism. Post-Structural Constructivism.



Functional Ontological Minimalism,



a post-metaphysical ontology that grounds structure in function and perception, not abstraction.



# To solve:



## How is relation possible



## Terms



Relation:

Thing:



# Conceptual Model



## Identity



A conceptual model has the general structure if _structure of conceptual models_.



## Constitution



A _conceptual model_ consists of the general structure of _structure of conceptual models_, meaning it has the four categories: identity, constitution, constraint and emergence.



## Constraint



# Structure of Conceptual Models



## Identity



### ...



The definition of terms are not sequential. A _conceptual model_ is our understanding of something, like "football team", "game development", "thermostat", "house", "chess". The general structure of _conceptual model_ is defined by _structure of conceptual models_. Thus we define the generic model of any concept. However, the _structure of conceptual models_ is itself a _conceptual model_ just like any other. We are to define a general pattern (_structure of conceptual models_), with a specific instance of that general pattern, and that specific instance will be a _conceptual model_. Another way to express it is that _structure of conceptual models_ is a specific _conceptual model_ that tries to describe what a _conceptual model_ is like. A _conceptual model_ can thus be made to describe its own general form. That new _conceptual model_ we make in order to describe its own general form, is called _structure of conceptual models_.



It would be tempting to say that a _conceptual model_ can describe itself, and thus claim clever self-reference. It is not correct to say it can describes itself. We can say that a _conceptual model_ can be made, that describes the general pattern ..., then the description refers to that general pattern. But to say it describes "itself" would be to mean that it describes itself as the specific instance of that pattern, and that is not what it does. The specific instance of _conceptual model_ can not describe _itself the specific instance conceptual model_, because a _conceptual model_ refers to something beyond itself as the description, but to say it describes _itself_ would be to say it is a description that describes its description, which is eternal recursion. The specific instance does not describe the specific instance, but we make a specific instance to describe the general pattern of any instance. We avoid having the instance descripe itself as an instance, but instead have it describe the general nature of an instance, or in other words: it’s describing what any conceptual model would look like, not describing itself as one of those conceptual models.



Thus, we can not say that our _conceptual model_ can describe itself in that sense, because a description refers to something that is fuller than the description in its existence. If a _conceptual model_ describes itself, it would itself be the very complete thing, that it itself tries to

does not describe the specific instance, but the general pattern.



, because the _itself_ part is what the specific _conceptual model_ is. So if it is a conceptual model of _chess_, then the very conceptual model _itself_, is the description of _itself_. Any conceptual model



because the thing being described is the full description of itself merely by existing, and the description itself thus is not the full description. We can however say that a _conceptual model_ ca



a _conceptual model_ , bur rather that a _conceptual model_ can describe the general structure applying to all _conceptual models_. Thus we call that _structure of conceptual models_.



Why must _structure of conceptual models_ be a _conceptual model_? Why must the description of the general nature of _conceptual model_ be a _conceptual model_?



If we are to meaningfully understand the general pattern of all conceptual models, that understanding also need be perceived as a conceptual model. But the perceiver has an interest in what things to perceive, for he or she is interested primarily in useful things to the perceivers self-interest. Thus, for a conceptual model to occur to the perceiver, it must be perceived as meaningful. The perceiver is thus part of the model being perceived, in that the perceivers self-interest invests in the model as useful. Models around meaninglessness can not be built, because meaningless things would not be of interest to the perceiver to perceptually differentiate and analyzed and concluded as conceptual models, simply because there is no believed use for them. All and any conceptual model must have the perceiver as part of it, meaning the perceivers preferences sustains the model. The perceiver and the process of perceptual differentiation are crucial to any conceptual model. _Structure of conceptual models_ must be a _conceptual model_ itself, because there can not be any structure outside _conceptual model_ because it is such a fundamental concept that for anything to exist outside it, it would exist outside perception, and that is not possible. Because _conceptual model_ resides at the origin of all meaning, it must be part of anything, even its own description. _Conceptual model_ is the perceptual basis, even for a model made to understand its own general structure.



All meaningful perception is mediated by conceptual models. For something to be perceived as a meaningful structure, it must be meaningfully and uniquely differentiated. This differentiation, the process by which understanding is formed, is conceptual modeling. Therefore, even the general structure of conceptual models must itself be made meaningful to the perceiver by becoming a conceptual model. However, for anything to be meaningful, it must be associated with the perceivers perception, and only then will perceptual differentiation and analyzis preform the conceptual modelling to create the conceptual model.



The perceiver is not external to the perceived and somehow outside of it, observing and defining the _conceptual model_. Instead, the perceiver of a _conceptual model_ is part of the very thing being perceived, and influences how the thing is structured to appear to the perceiver. This sounds counterintuitive. After all, I am watching the 31-inch screen outside myself as I type this. That is true. My body is clearly separated from the screen. Let us clarify that any mere sensory perception is never, the focal point of this ontology. It does not try to describe the pressumed _real_ that ought to describe _things as they are in absolute relaity_. This ontology does not concern itself with such an absolute reality independent or not of the perceiver. It would rather look at absolute claims with suspicion, suspecting a conceptual model is mistaken for being an absolute truth, and that the statement of absolute truth rather reflects absolute ignorance. Still, there selfevidently to the perceiver are absolute truths in the sens that they absolutely applie: falling off a cliff has an undeniable consequence, and is not a matter of choice of conceptual model. This ontology, while not dealing with absolute truths, deal with _absolutely relevant truths_. These are truths that are relevant to the perceiver. At the very core of _absolutely relevant truths_ is the truth that _a certain thing of perception is favoured over another_. This truth is evident, because the human makes a choice reflecting that value.



A human being, no matter its beliefs, will make certain choices favouring something over something else. A choice has to be made, and choice reflects values. No human would jump off a cliff deadly as naturally as it comes to seek food. A human who does self-harm, for example refuses to eat, does so, also reflecting a certain value in opposition to the value of the opposite choice. The perciever simply can not perceive anything without favouring one thing over another. A person who claims to meditate and get into _pure perception_ without judgment, would simply, to start with, initiate that based in a choice to do so. It would be one choice among all other possible choices reflecting other values. Technically, a person in a serious medical condition, who perhaps does only perceive without any activation of the executive function of the frontal cortex, likely is not in an functional state of being, and would be consumed by a wild animal in the forest. Such a person isn't consumed by wild animals, because he or she relies on the help of others and is protected in a hospital. However, the point is that nature itself, the _absolutely relevant truth_, would terminate such a person, and so, nature encourages choice and values of that which leads to self-preservance. Every human being, in capacity of perception, knows innately to prioritize favourable things. Culture may articulate religious ideas, or the stupidity of youth (such as in "you only live once" and "live fast, die young") in attempts to transcend the _absolute relevant reality_, but the same people still evidently act to keep their own vitality to some degree, and in doing so, confirming the truth of these _absolutely relevant truths_. They do something right, they live on collected resources and vitality, or they by benefiting from others who knowingly or not protect them from reality that simply neither resonate with their ideas nor care about them, as consequences in old age overshadows the once so youthfull consciousness with bitterness and regret,... for what? for bad choices, all in acordance with the _absolute relevant reality_. It could be argued modern civilication, born of the intelligence of mankind, protects us from wild animals, and thus we can discard what is here claimed as _absolutely relevant truths_, to be nothing but _largely irrelevant concerns_. But...



Contemporary modern society only makes the same _absolutely relevant truths_ more subtle. Old age, sickness, misfortune and so on, are still self-evident in the experience of humans, and well confirms the _absolutely relevant truth_ that certain choices have better outcome, and thus certain thing in perception are favoured over others, thus reflecting certain values over others. Choice, value, the progression of sequential time -- these are all _absolutely relevant truths_. Furthermore, even if society protects itself against nature, old age, and sickness, there still is the dimension of human social interaction also demanding choice for the same reason of preservance, as for example, political enemies may seek to cause detriment to eachother. The _absolutely relevant truth_ is on of binary: either or, good, bad, favourable or not, etc. The human being, merely by existing, is forced to the core beneath all layers of nuance, to the _absolute relevant truth_ which is the binary truth of that certain things are favored over others, and if not, related consequences follow. Remaining at the gray zone also is not possible, as time itself progresses, and tilts the surface for the individual to slip, more often than not, to the side of misery and detriment. In this ontology, what is true, is not a matter of what is thought of the world by elaborated theories, but from the simple self-evident reality of what one enacts. This ontology takes its fundamental strength from the fact humans enacts the _absolutely relevant truth_ as stated here.



Having outlined that this ontology rests on the self-evident truth that human beings enact choice prefering one thing over another, and we actually have to do so, we can now with precission clarify that any speculations or claimed absolute truths about reality as independet from our own perception, are irrelevant. The objective reality of the 31-inch screen I am looking at right now is not of interest. Instead, what matters, is the idea I have of how the screen is useful to me. I as a human being evaluates the usefulness of the screen, and construct an idea of how to relate to it for my benefit (or for whatever I value). I deterimine the usefulness of the object, and this reflects the _absolute relevant truth_, stating that I enact choice, preferring what I believe is better. Rather than concerining myself with the "objective reality" of the screen, I construct a _conceptual model_ of what the screen is, and this _conceptual model_ is influenced by what I, the perceiver, find valuable. If I am a computer programmer, I place the screen as my focal point as, perhaps, crucial, but if I am Neo-Luddite -- someone opposing modern technology in favour of a return to nature -- I will have a _conceptual model_ of the screen as being a piece of glorified junk. Of course, one may choose what is detremental, but this is still a choice, and still reflects that one thing is selected over another, and the reason behind the choice reflects a value, and that value is prefered by the actor, for whatever reason. While an adult can be confused about values, and believe that all values are equal and a matter of choice, this is against the self-evident nature of things. If such was the case, a child would not innately prefer constructive actions by default such as seeking and consuming food. Confusion of basic truth happens as a skewing of the value system, for among other reasons, cultural reasons. Culture may believe differently, but it is also self-evident that violent contact sports, with hits against the head, is a detriment to the cells of the brain. It is self-evident with scientific knowledge, but also without it, because nature enacts the consequence of causing mental disability. The self-evidence consists of that nature responds accordingly, and this is part of the _absolute relevant truth_ which enforces better choice over worse. Clear is that values are not, at its fundamental level, a matter of personal choice. While humans may demand freedom to be respected for personal choice, nature doesn't offer that, and has no sympathy for those who suffer the consequences, whereas they, perhaps, in contempt of the nature of things, seek sympathy from others. It was stated earlier that while most of us in modern society do not have to fear wild animals, the thret agains a human's wellbeeing is still just as real, even if more subtle, which necessiates choice of what is better over what is worse. The modern term "burn out" reflects this, with the meaning that a person is overworked, having caused high cortisol levels for prolonged times, and having been in repeated and prolonged states of fight-or-flight, causes damages to the internal being. Such missery is a consequence which very much confirms the _absolute relevant truth_ that detremental consequences are real and thatthe human being has an invested interest, by, to the best of ones ability, making certain choices over others, to avoid such detremental consequences.



Having now clarified that there are consequences, choice, values and preference, and that there is no state of being free from these, we can now clarify the most fundamental aspect of perception, which this ontology is based in. We naturally favour one thing over another, and thus, there must be at least two things in a moment of perception. Because there are two things, there must be difference. If there is difference, each of the parts must be unique and different from each other. If perception can be of such a kind that it can perceive difference and uniqueness, then definition and boundaries can be known. The uniqueness being perceived is hereby termed _unit_. It is important to point out an _unit_ refers to anything occuring to perception, where a thought therefore also is an _unit_, just as much as a physichal chair is. However, when we perceive the chair, we layer ontop of that perception or conceptual understanding of what it is. Without conceptual understanding, the chair is meaningless and likely will not be noticed. It is difficult to imagine how a chair could not be noticed, but that is only because our conceptual understanding of chairs is so deeply rooted that we recognize them instantly. Someone scanning a crowd for a person in a red shirt will see it right away, while someone not looking for it may not notice it at all, because it holds no immediate meaning. The same applies to sound: certain birdsongs carry meaning for someone with the conceptual understanding to interpret them, while to others they are just background noise. Another example is a police officer or interrogator trained to notice subtle behavioral cues. Where an untrained observer might see only a relaxed person, the officer may recognize signs of concealment, deception, or intoxication. Their conceptual model informs their perception, shaping what they see, what they interpret, and what meaning emerges from the encounter. At a fundamental level, there is no difference in perception between imaginations, thoughts, sight, sound etc. All of these rely on the perceivers capability of _perceptually differentiation_.



This ontology then recognizes _perceptual difference_ itself to be part of any object that is perceived. It is what _constrains_ the object to have a particular form. Without perceptual defferentiation, there can not be awareness of where the object starts and ends. Any kind of object must inherently be differentiated from everything else to be perceived meaningfully. The perceptual differentiation is seen as integral to the object. If the objects boundaries are there _in objective reality_ is not a matter of interest. What matters is that the perceiver perceives those boundaries. One person may perceive a set of speakers to include the cables, whereas another may say that "speakers" refers only to the speaker units. Each perceiver draws the boundaries differently, and obviously they deal with a _conceptual model_, not with the here pressumed objective reality.



A _conceptual model_ is an idea that occur in the mind of the perceiver. The _conceptual model_ has internal descernable _units_ making upp the model. The many _units_ of the inside of the _conceptual model_ are structured in accordance with the _structure of conceptual models_ which is a analytical, fundamental structure. It defines the fundamental categories of any _conceptual model_ and it analyzes the inside of a _conceptual model_ to correctly identify and categorize the _units_ according to the structure stipulated by that _structure of conceptual models_.



So... to define and understand a given _conceptual model_ we apply _structure of conceptual models_. However, that one is itself a _conceptual model_. If we want to understand _structure of conceputal models_, which itself is a _conceptual model_, we need to apply itself in describing itself. The text you are reading now is the _structure of conceptual models_ treating itself as a _conceptual model_ being subject to the analysis of _structure of conceptual models_.



These are brief definitions. Their exact definitions are understood by following how each term emerges in and trough the _the universal categories_.



#### Unit



#### Relation



#### Constitution



#### Constraint



#### Emergence



#### Identity



#### Universal categories



### The thing



A _structure of conceptual models_ is a _conceptual model_ describing the general structure of all possible conceptual models.



It is an analytical, prescriptive, descriptive, fundamental structure that can be applied to express any _conceptual model_.



- It is _fundamental_ in the sense it is the structure of any thing (including itself).

- It is a _structure_ in the sense that, for a _thing_, it postulates three generative categories and the specific meaning of the relations between the content of each of them, and it postulates a fourth category, a derivational category, being the conclusive definition as based in the previous three categories.

- It is _analytical_ in the sense that it identifies genrative _units_ and places them in a suitable generative category, and then analyses the relations among _units_ in the three categories,

- It is _descriptive_, in the sense a _conceptual model_ is described by the derivational category.

- It is _prescriptive_, in the sense it is applied to structure the perceivers perception of a thing for exhaustive perceptual clarity, consequently influencing the perceivers choices.



Thus, a _structure of things_, when applied in constructing a _conceptual model_, organizes the perception for exhaustive perceptual clarity (including itself, thus).



The _stcuture of conceptual models_ is a systematization of the innate human ability to analyze and categorize sensory impressions in order to create a conceptual model that becomes the focal point of understanding sensory input as meaningful. The meaningful understanding that the resultant conceptual model embodies, is the kind of understanding that precedes choice and action of the perceiver, in a world where there are consequences. The conceptual model meaningfully understands its subject such that desicions can be made in favour of the perceivers interest. _Structure of conceptual models_ is applied as a method of systematic analysis yielding exhausting perceptual clarity of the subject of its analysis. Thus, its applicatoin can be seen as a crystalization of understanding of its subject.



_Structure of conceptual models_ is based, not in _absolute truth_ but in _absolutely relevant truth_. The notation of _absolute truth_ -- a single idea that everything must be acknowledged by -- is flipped upside down and brought from superior to inferior under the pragmatic excellence of _structure of conceptual models_. Simultaneously, it avoids the trap of endless relativity -- that no value is valuable as all value is relative -- and thus, remains exactly pragmatically excellent. It is based in _absolutely relevant truth_, meaning it is based in what is self-evidently the case as evident by the perceivers actions and environment. Detriment, misery, death, failure, choice, values, preference--these are all self-evident, in that, no matter the belief of the human, he or she acts accordingly. This ontology takes its basis truth, where truth is that which time and time again is affirmed by the actions of the human being. One of those truths, for example, is that a human being chooses one thing over antoher, that the consequences are different. Even a religious group claiming to know reality as opposite of what is stated here, will still exercise choice in selecting members for different roles for their religious community, and the selection process is optimized to promote the outcome of cohesion, administration and upholding of dogma. While their claim and belief may be opposite, their actions reflect the _absolutely relevant truth_ stated here. The religious order, as the example, failing to aknowledge this, while still enacting this truth, is pragmatically inferior. This ontology does not state absolute truth, but states that this is absolutely relevant, as this is the condition of the human. It deals with things at the level of the human condition, rather than an arbitrary absolute truth that has to be assumed, and only is reasonable within its own system of logic. This ontology is not based on its own internal logic where the premisses have to be assumed and can not be sensed. Instead, it is based in what can be directly sensed, as for example that choice has consequence, and that certain choice yields prefered outcome, or, if that wouldnt be the case, the religious order would simply dissolve, just as the jumping off of a steep cliff disolves life. Sure, the religious order can have a belief in eternal life, but it is self-evident the members of the community no longer live to tell that story, if they choose to jump off the cliff.



_Absolutely relevant truth_ is that we do perceive sensory input and form distinct concepts, such as "chair", "emotion", "strategy". The concepts we form comes to influence how we interact with the world. A chair tall as a tree would breach our concept of "chair as for sitting on", and instead be conceptualized as a humorous thing, an artistic installation, advertisment for a chair-shop. Climbing it and sitting on it would be for humorous effect, not for practical reason. Two different outcomes depending on how we conceptualize the sensory input. This is evident. Put a human in a room, and you will time and time again have it proved that he or she has conceptual categories and relates to them according to the personal concept. This is observable and verifiable.



With this basic _absolutely relevant truth_, this ontology asserts that this conceptualizing activity of the human is fundamental for understanding of, and orienting in the world. This can also be verified, in that a human will seek one outcome over another, and the conceptual model at hand is a determining factor in that.



Thus there is such a thing as conceptual accuracy, in that when the model is basis of choice, there is a perceivable response that is sensed (reality responds to actions), and this response is in alignment with what can be infered from the conceptual model. If the response is different, the model is not accurate.



To this, is added that the human has an interest in certain outcomes, and thus an interest in the acuracy of certain conceptual models. Thus, analyzing how to improve the process of constructing accurate conceptual models becomes a hihgly relevant meta goal. The better conceptual models we can create, the better the outcome will be able to match what is desired. Most people will never think of this process as a process that can be refined, but they refine it unknowingly and without the explicitly stated goal of doing so.



The _structure of conceptual models_ is applied with the explicit goal of framing conceptual models, and defining their content, with exhausting perceptual clarity. It is a way of increase the accuracy of conceptualizing sensory input as well as making those conceptualizations more complete as to increase the awareness of possible choices and consequences.



The _structure of conceptual models_ is not a mere alternative model of interpretation. It is not a model _that can be applied_. It is already in constant application by every functional human being. The _structure of conceptual models_, as defined here, is a clarification of what already is ongoing. Such a clarification makes a concept of that very process, and as such, just as we understand anything else, we also understand the process of understanding itself, and just as when we understand anything we also can improve our choices, it is equally true that when we understand the process of understanding, we can improve also that process, consequently improving the understanding of anything aimed to be understood.



Here it will now be shown how the what _structure of conceptual models_ refer to is precicely an innate operational process of the human being in its conceptual interaction with sensory input. The last example will show how the human enacts the innate process of conceptual modelling, even at a level where language isn't yet applied, effectively showing that what _structure of conceptual models_ accurately refers to something real and self-evident.



The four categories stipulated by _structure of conceptual models_ can be simplified to four questions, which can be asked of any thing, and the progression of answering those questions sets in motion the outlining of the conceptual model the human has as basis for relating to the sensory input.



- What is this thing? (Example: Eminem's "Lose Yourself": Lyrics in a rhythmically aggressive, introspective hip-hop style.)

- What is it made of? (Example: Multi-syllabic rhymes, wordplay, emotional themes, syncopated phrasing.)

- What is it constrained by? (Example: 8-bar structure, instrumental tempo, rhyme scheme, breath control.)

- How its parts interconnected? (Example: Each line leads into the next through rhyme chaining and narrative progression, maintaining tension and thematic coherence.)



The music, as an example, can be perceived, and felt, without explicitly analyzing it by the above questions, but the perception of it still relies on a perceptual differentiation, lending the ability to recognize structure and categorize it as meaningful. The perceiver may not ask the above questions explicitly, but will sense it anyhow, even if to different degrees and in different orders:



- What is this thing? (Example: "Ah, I love this")

- What is it made of? (Example: "Are you serious? the beat, the lyrics, the flow!")

- What is it constrained by? (Example: "I love the way he plays with the words, and the beat is so smooth!")

- How its parts interconnected? (Example: "The way the rythm matches the narration makes makes the overall soundscape tell the story, not just the words, is just brilliant!")



Person A: "Why is the track so good?"

Person B: "Seriously! Just listen!"



What happens in that dialogue is that person B recognizes the song to be meaningful, but without articulating why. This must be based in perception and differentiation, or person B would not be able to differentiate it from static noise or from an ninspiring track. In the case of the Eminem track, person B knows that something different is happening in the song, because it is relying on the 8-bar technique etc, but person A may not have a way to describe why it is different from other musical tracks. At this stage person B has a non-explicit conceptual model:



- What is this thing? (Example: "Play that track again" <- there is a sense of a distinct concept being comunicated by the arrangment of all the parts of the track)

- What is it made of? (Example: "Rythmically nodding with the music and singing along momentarily" <- different parts are recognized, or there wouldnt be any aligned reaction)

- What is it constrained by? (Example: "Thinks of the music as a certain genre" <- recoznises the music stays within its genre, and expects it to stay within that genre)

- How its parts interconnected? (Example: "Gets shiverings" <- different parts connect and creates the recognition of something beyond the parts themselves)



The spontanious analysis as shown in the example above, is made into a systematic analysis by applying _structure of conceptual models_, for the purpose of exhausting perceptual clarity. Whereas _structure of conceptual models_ is a way to bulid a conceptual model of anything (a song, an activity, a mental state, an object etc...), any form of analysis of sensory impressions, be it systematic or spontaneous, is always done within any of the stipulated categories. Rather than having a mere sense that one's understanding of a thing is beneficial, or having a sense it simply doesn't need to be questioned, it is actually the level of intricacy and accuracy in analysis that determines how useful one's _conceputal model_ is in producing a beneficial outcome.



The ability of recognizing the general structure of any concept and with rigor analyze it, for complete comprehension, lends exhausting perceptual clarity. Perception's movement across the categories stipulated by _structure of conceptual models_ is a natural movement of the necessary attempt of understanding how to interpret sensory input to nagivate for the right corresponding consequences, in a world where the wrong consequence are undesired.



Perception is here seen as not just the sensory input, but



---



Reading: The _structure of things_ can be applied in analyzing anything to describe it with exhausting perceptual clarity. Thus, the analytical process of applying _structure of things_ is applied to describe itself. This very scentence is read right now by a perceiver, who is applying the _structure of things_ to discern what a _structure of things_ is. Right now, as this is being read word by word, the analyzis is enacted by the structural category of _identity_, right now, being isolated and brought to perception as a part of the _thing_ which in this case is _structure of things_. The _structure of things_ contains in itself the means to construct itself, in relation to a perceiver. There is nothing outside _structure of things_ that describes and justifies it.



A _structure of things_ is a potential perceptual structure any things. That is; the _thing_ does not exist as such to the perceiver, unless the perceptual differentiation process of the perceiver, is capable of differentiating the thing and its content by this structure. Thus, _structure of a thing_ is enacted, putting analysis in action, causing exhaustive perceptual clarity to be realized.



A _structure of a thing_ is a _thing_ (becomes a recursive structure with _constitution_ in regard; see _constitution_). It is not a thing in a sense of being a separate thing beside other things. It is a _thing_ in the sense that it is any _thing_, wherever a _thing_ is present.



We thus do not have _structure of things_ that acts on a _thing_ to for example describe it, like _logos_ acts on humans, to describe them. Instead, the _structure of things_ is intrinsic: it is the way any thing is. The _structure of things_ thus is self-evident by the very being of the thing. The thing itself, by existing, and thus necessarily having the structure of _structure of things_, thus is self-evident as a _thing_ with _structure of things_ intrinsic. Thus, _structure of things_ is not conceptual framing that is applied to analyze a thing. It is the organizing principle of the thing, necessarily arising from its beingness. A thing, being its own complete description, merely by being in its perceived uniqueness, is thus self-analyzing. Any thing applies its own analytical fundamental structure, to itself, even if that reality remains indirect as a mere potential for the perceiver to realize by applying the analytical fundamental structure of _structure of things_. The thing is self-structuring in the sense it is a thing that the perceiver then can analyze to perceive the very structure. The structure of _structure of things_ is true, because it can be verified. If _structure of things_ would be ontologically irrational, it would not be able to be verified in a thing.



For any thing x, if x exists, then x necessarily conforms to the structure of things; and the truth of this structure is verifiable through the perception of x.



Because all things intrinsically have the self-evident structure of _structure of a thing_, any _thing_ described, necessarily can be analyzed by _structure of a thing_, because it has the foundational structure of _structure of a thing_. It is thus always possible to analyze a thing by applying _structure of a thing_, even the _structure of things_ itself, as is being done here. The _structure of things_ is a analytical fundamental structure, used to analyze things, and as such, it is its own thing, and thus can itself be analyzed by the same structure of analysis that it is.



(The _structure of things_ postulates a set of properties: identity, constitution, constraint, emergence.)



## Constitution



A _structure of things_, meaning the general pattern of all _conceptual models_, consists of the perceiver (the reader of this text), for without it, there is no enacting of perceptual differentiation to perceptually constrain and identify the _conceptual model_ in acordance with the _structure of things_.



Because _structure of things_ describes the general pattern of all _conceptual models_, the perceiver is part of all _conceptual models_ being described. The percevier should not believe there is a _conceptual model_ somewhere external to the perceiver, that exists independently, that several people tap in to. It is that the specific perceiver is part of every _conceptual model_ it perceives, and thus comes to form the model itself, based in the perceivers characteristics and not in other characteristics independent of the perceiver.



Thus, while this same description is the same to two different perceivers, when they both read it, and enact the description by applying it, analyzing something by it, and building a _conceptual model_, then, each in their own case, is part of influencing the perception



### Thing



A _structure of things_ consists of a _thing_.



- It can only be reflected in a thing. The _structure of things_ is not a trancendental entity, that, if somehow all other things were to vanish, it would remain as "pure substance", "prior to any thing", "from which all things are made". A _structure of things_, contrary to that, is, wherever there is a thing. All things can be analyzed by _structure of things_. A _structure of things_ is not in addition to a _thing_, like logos describing humans. It is not a substrata (for example "pure consciousness"). A _structure of things_ is _the thingness of any thing_.



### Perceiver



A _structure of things_ consists of a perceiver (which in itself is also a _structure of things_).



- A perciever is part of the _structure of things_, because without the perceiver, there is no perception of the thing. The meaningful existence of a thing is dependent on the perceiver. Because there is a perceiver, there is a differentiation of perception enacted by the perceiver.



A perceiver is anything that can describe itself in terms of the _structure of things_. (Directly conscious entity is self-aware, an indirectly concious entity is an entity that can describe itself and is acting as an extension of self-aware enteties (an organizatoin, an AI, and similar)



Because a perceiver describes itslef in terms of the _structure of things_, it also implies a process of choice and purpose. The choices defining the conscious entity (for example a human choosing the values of "athletic") affects the perception of other things, like a bicycle, such that either the things are useful or not to the self-interest of the being perceiving them. A central thing defining a self-conscious entity is self-preservance. Tools to secure self-preservance are favoured over non-functional things.



### Does not consist of



A _structure of things_, or any thing, **does not** consists of a _structure of things_. Even if it has the same categories identified by it (identity, constitution etc...). It is because the categories emerges as self-evident from the process of differentiating perception which all objects are constituted of. Any object thus have all it need to self-organize these categories, and this self-organizing is exactly what _structure of things_ describe. Thus, _structure of things_ does not stipulate a set of categories, it merely show how these, and exactly these, inveitabely emerges in any object.



## Constraint



### Ontological truth



The _thing_ must be an _ontological truth_, meaning:



- It defines a base unit.

- The base unit must apply equally to all possible subjects.

- within the ontological system.

- All parts of the affects the whole. (The specific _units_ of constitution, constraint and emergence affects the _identity_)



### Perception



A _things_ is differentiated perception. By the ability to differentiate, we can isolate one thing, recognize it as unique and different from other things.



### Identity



A thing is constrained by its identity. Identity is an emergence, that becomes a constraint.



At the core, we have the recognition of difference in perception. How perception is differentiated (meaning where we percieve the boundaries of a thing) is defined by its identity. One may be surprised many more expensive speakers do not come with cables or even amplifiers. That is because in the domain of high end speakers another ontology presides, where the concept of a speaker is limited to the actual speaker unit, whereas in the budget market, a speaker is understood as "that which makes sound" which then implies a whole set of common things such as sound cables and power adapters. A thing here, thus is understood and delineated by an describable idea. If you ask the dealer in a high end shop about the cables, he would _describe_ the _idea_ that the speaker unit is _just the speakers and not the sound cables_. In a _structure of things_, the identity is the highest delimiting factor, which is also contained within the thing, and thus the thing contains its own boundaries. (It is thus self-delimiting).



The _structure of things_ contains its own boundary as a reflection of its identity. Embeded in the thing itself, is the identity which is the highest structural contraint, or structural affirmation.



It is the act of differentiating perception to isolate the thing by its _identity_ and locate the defining parts (constitution, constraint and emergence) of its identity within itself, (rather than putting the identity outside the thing), that makes the identity self-emerge.



It contains the conditions for its own organization.



## Emergence



A thing must be differentiable. A thing can only exist if it is differentiated from others (from this follows that _structure of things_ is a differentiable, and if so, it implies a unique content, and it implies a boundary by which it can be separated from what it is not, thus implying an inside, and implying identity, and identity in turn implies differentiated perception of its inside, to be able to perceive its uniqueness, which must be there, if the thing is able to be separated from other things. The uniqueness of a thing can be analyzed and knonw, because there is differentiated perception. Differentiation is the fundamental constraining factor.)



The act of putting constraints on the constitution of a thing, is the act of structuring (?) perception of the constitution of the _thing_, which naturally yields emergent structures and behaviours, which inherently becomes part of the thing.



The inside of the _thing_ can be analyzed to have constitutents, and contraints, naturally, because it muust have content that differentiates it from other things. The category constitution and constraint thus are emergent categories of a things identity (that it has an unique _inside_) and the perceivers process of differentiation to perceive the constitution and constraints of the inside.



Thus, of the constraint of differentiated perception, the emergent categories of _constitution_ and _constraint_ are derived. The category _emergence_ is derived as a consequence of the analysis of _constitution_ and _constraint_, and all in its totality constitutes the category _identity_.



### Self-aserting



(Perhaps the most impoprant emergent feature of a thing): All parts are aligned to support the identity. This is implicit, as the identity is integral, and a identity can not be integral to a thing that does not honor it. The boundary of a thing (how a thing is differentiated from other things) is in its totality defined by identity. Things that do not align with the identity, are simply outside the thing, not part of the thing. Remember, a thing is self-evident. It does not need a description on a paper, like a blueprint. It itself is its own description. A thing is self-evident, in that its existence tells what it is (and it can not be wrong or incomplete about it). Any analysis of a thing, thus is evidently correct if it aligns with the self-evident _thing_. It will be evident if a part of a thing relates to the identity or not. In describing a thing, we can do conceptual errors of putting non-identityful aspects in the description, but that is just a bad description, and will simply not have any relation to any thing in reality, other than the bad description itself being a _thing_ that is a bad description.



#### Sum



For any thing to be perceived, there needs to be perception of difference. Based in percieving difference, we recognize a thing, any thing, has properties, , identity, etc. Thus, several dimensions of a thing are outlined. This differentiation among aspects of a thing is possible, because the fundamental constraint of any object, is differentiation. By differentiating things of perception, a set of aspects, or dimensions, or properties, of a thing can be perceived.



The relations between these the categories constitution and constraint of the thing, gives rise to certain emergent features of the thing, which comes to further define the _thing_ and comprise its category of identity.



To call specific things into perception, they must be differentiated for their unique attributes, and the _structure of things_ serves as a way to structure perception of any thing to frame the perception of its specific content with exhausting perceptual clarity, which is achieved by structuring perception to frame its specific content in all its parts in all dimensions, not just a few. The degree of a specific hammer's usefullness is better understood if the totality of what makes the hammer is understood. Therein is for example the identity of the hammer, by which we recognize it. Reviewing the constitution, constraint and emergent features also reveals more of its identity and thus its degree of usefulness. The thing is also containing the perceiver as a constraining factor, meaning the emergence of the specific identity of the _thing_, is shaped by the perceivers values. Sure, a hammer exists _as it is_ regardless of the perceivers values, but it exist only as meaningful, or useful in other words, to the perceiver, depening on the values of the perceiver. The evidence of this is that the following is not perceived as a thing of value to most people: `1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03`, but with the analytical fundamental structure, the thing will be perceived. For example: Identity: A header of a compression file format specifying its identity as `Gzip`, with with associated metadata such as compression method, used to correctly parse the compressed data. Constitutes: Sequential series of binary data. Constraint: the header must come first. Emergence: the rest of the data can be parsed.



In the same way, the thing is recognized to be related to other distinct things, which are perceived by the same capability of perception of difference, is able to discern the things being part of the constitution of the thing. The constitution is also seen as integral to the thing. One could argue the parts of a speaker are not integral to it (they are different external things, just put in the same speaker box, and they all have their own blueprints and can even be sold separately). However, the boundary of a thing (how we differentiate it from other things) is determined here by the integral identity of a thing. All things needed for the identity are considered integral to the thing. The thing specifies all of its parts in _constitutoin_ and a thing is thus self-constituting.



We recognize the constitution, constraint and emergence align with the identity of the thing, whatever the thing. The alignment of constitution and properties, with identity, gives the emergence of the thing being self-defining, because it defines its own identity. By its self-definition, it determines what constitution is needed, and thus is self-constituting.



Just as integral to the thing as identity is, is also the structure that fulfills the identity, and thus the thing is self-fulfilling.



### Structural properties



By the constraint of differentiated perception, several structural categories arises. These amounts to the analysis of the identity of the _thing_. _Identity_ itself also being an emergent structural category.



#### Identity



Identity is the expression of a _thing_ in its completeness. The _thing_ itself, is an expression of itself in completeness. In the _structure of things_, the _thing_ is analyzed by the way of the analytical fundamental structure, which is the _structure of things_. By the mentioned analysis, the identity of an object can be described as a conclusion of its constitution, constraints, and emergence, such that a perceiver has enough structur to perception to be able to recognize the thing itself as occuring in perception. This is very easy to prove. The perceiver of this text will have enough structured perception to perceive the _thingness_ of the following (which was an example explained earlier): `1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03`. The perceiver can only perceive this as meaningful if the _thingness_ of it has first been analyzed and known in some way. If analyzed by applying _structure of things_, the perceiver will have exhausting perceptual clarity in perceiving it. A poor analysis will yield a perception of it as thing such as "it's probably a header of some sort" and such understanding is arrived at by analyzing it against a set of prior experiences, fragments of knowledge and inference. What thing is perceived in this case, meaning, what thing comes into meaningful existence for the perceiver, depends on the perceivers values directing attention to either analyze this thing to know it, or to not do it. The knowing of things, and the degree of clarity, comes to determine the course of a perceivers experiences, where the perceiver naturally has interest in certain experiences. Knowing of certain things is required for certain jobs. Knowing of edible plants is crucial in a certain survival situation.



The analysis _is not_ the _thing_, but describes the _thing_ such that its _isness_ can be recognized.



What the thing is in its self-contained totality. The sum total of its categories; constitution, constraint, and emergence.



It also does not refer to representational layer; that which is semantically attributed to. That would be to refer to the more concrete level.



Without the category "identity", there is just emergence as structure, but no definitive clarification that that is what the thing _is_. _Identity_ clearly states what of its constitution makes its total identity. Identity thus is the totality of the structure constituting the thing.



Example: _Traffic light_ will be our example. We define the _thing_ that people refer to when they say I just got lucky with the _trafic light_ still being yellow while passing. The _thing_ being refered to here, obviously is not only the trafic light box.



Identity of _trafic light_: A trafic light is a device that stops trafic in accordance with trafic situation and law. It consists of a box displaying three lights, green, yellow, red. It is placed in a crossroad, towards the traffic it intends to control. It is connected to a trafic light network.



One may ask why take _trafic light_ in everyday speech. It serves as a good example to show the everyday speach relates to a _thing_, and how the perception of this thing is structured by the perceiver, who, regardless any strict definition, perceives the thing _trafic light_ to be more than the strict definition. Then, by the analysis of _structure of things_ we form exhausting perceptual clarity, and thereby become aware of not only the trafic light box, but also its placement and the trafic light network. The perceptual clarity is useful, and here is a continuation of the example to show that: "I noticed it switched in a slightly different way today, compared to my previous experiences. That is likely because emergency veichles were driving by, but I havn't heard any, thus there is a probability there is civile cops around here, having switched the lights at nearby crossroads. All of this was able to be acheived because of exhausting perceptual clarity, achieved by analysing the everyday speach of _trafic light_.



As stated by this ontology, that things come into existence when known by analysis, by the way, is further very clear in case of civilian police, serving as great example. Effort is made to prevent the _thing_ called civilian police car, from being perceptually differentiated by analysis as to establish its identity as an unit of state authority. Only those who can correctly discern its constitution and constraints can hope to succeed. For example, in old times, it was known all civilian police cars had certain patterns in the numbering of the licence plates. When designing the "civile police car", the designer in question may not have had perceptual clarity enough to consider the default number plate creation a constraint of the thing _civil police car_, and thus had no awareness of how the plates would end up being printed in a pattern as a consequence of the default settings in the ordering process.



#### Constitution



Perception of difference allows for unique things to be percieved. Before any structure is seen in any thing, these are just things that are different from each other. Because we need useful things, we recognize uniqueness among things and ascribe different meaning to different things. We deem things meaningful, meaning the thing aligns in such a way it produces outcome deemed useful. _Constitution_ are the things that a thing must consist of for it to be able to align with its identity.



The color green is not red. We know there is a difference, but still, at this stage, there is no meaning ascribed to the things themselves. We have not yet linked them fully with a identity, just recognized that there are different things, and that we have selected some things to be listed listed under _constitution_ that later in _emergence_ will show to be meaningful to the identity.



Example: A trafic light has green, yellow, red. It constitutes of a box displaying these lights. _Trafic light_ (in our particular use of the word) also consists of a trafic light network.



#### Constraint



Like rules governing the constitution. Example: Constitution: green and red. Constraint: can not be a combination of the two colors.



Can constrain both constitution and emergence, thus full power in shaping the identity.



Continuing the trafic light example: Constraints are now put on the constituting colors:



The trafic light must be separated from a disco light (especially when some disco props are made to imitate the look of traffic lights). Thus, placement is a constraint of _trafic light_, if by the _thing_ trafic light, we mean a device that actually stops trafic (not merely provide light).



- There can only be 3 colors.

- Only one color can be lit at a time, except for yellow, which can be lit with red.

- Must be placed in a crossroad, towards the trafic it intends to control.

- Each light must be a certain luminosity.

- Must be connected with a network that can control the lights. (this constraint is put here, becasue we, later in _identity_ define "trafic light" as a thing that stops trafic in accordance with trafic situation and law)



#### Emergence



(There can be many emergences...)



(The typical meaning of emergence)... The constitution and constraints, and relations among them, form emergent patterns and behaviours.



The trafic light example:



- Connected to the trafic light network, and placed correctly, the trafic light unit will light up the appropriate color and display it in the direction of the trafic to be controlled.



### X properties



#### Self-evident



A thing is the description of itself. The description of a thing is not external to itself. A blueprint would be a thing (it is a blueprint) that describes another thing. However, both the blueprint and the building it describes are two separate things, both having their own _thingness_. The _thingness_ is the complete description of the object. Because all things have _thingness_, all objects are their own description. They are self-evident. They do not need anything to describe them because their very composition is the highest level description of what they are. Just like a person may only understand half of a text description, a person may also only understand half of a _thing_ while observing the thing.



It follows that _structure of things_ itself, that which this text is describing, does not need these words. It exists in its completeness regardless. It is a claim that what this text describes, in fact does exist. This description could as well be false in the sense that it does not refer to anything real. An example of a false description: "Purple consists of the electromagnetic waves. Constraint: wavelength of 1000 nanometers" (it actually has wavelength of ~380 to 450 nm). In a sense, we never perceive the thing firsthand, but always by a layer of understanding, a cognitive model of the thing, that refers to presumed things in the world. We act not in direct relation to the thing itself, but first in relation to the cognitive model of the thing, and indirectly, trough such a model, do we relate to the thing. Our cognitive model is what informs our actions, and we correct or cognitive model by questioning the cognitive model if the result of our actions are not the expected as could be inferred from our cognitive model. Why do we interact indirectly with the _real_ in this way? Because direct perception of the _real_ would necessiate perception of its totality. Total perception would not filter things for usefulness, and thus would leave us vunerable to dangers such as falling off a cliff. Cognition creates perception itself is finetuned to perceive _things_ are useful to us, and to perceive them in increasingly more useful ways. Steep cliff thus is a thing where gravity, distance, direction, surface terrain all are fragments of the pressumed _real_, used to conceptually model the thing _steep cliff_, which we then relate toand successfully prevent a certain sequence of felt consequences. Here, it is also seen that the perceiver is involved in shaping the concept of the thing _steep cliff_. No, the perceiver doesn't shape the _real_ by his conceptual model, as the steep cliff remains regardless the thought of it. The perceiver shapes the very concept of it by including certain fragments of the _real_ such as gravity, distance etc. A value system underlies the selection process for how the concept is constructed, which is based in the perceivers interest. Thus, the conceptual model of the world, by which the perceiver interprets the _real_ is created in conjuction with the perceiver's self-interest. The created concept becomes the _thing_ to the perceiver. The _real_ simply is not directly meaningful to the perceiver. Only the concept is directly meaningful, because it is a shaped interpretation of the _real_, useful and necessary to the perceiver. The preceiver does not really know there is any _real_, but assumes so, because there is a predictability of the consequences of choices based on conceptual models. The perceiver assumes there is a _real_ that is vast, complete, and present, because conceptual models consistently creates predictable outcom when acted in relation to. This ontology does not care to claim there is or is not a _real_. It claim that the perceiver can not know it, but knows only conceptual models of its own making, and knows the felt effects of basing choice on them. Simultaneously, the preceiver is in direct contact with the _real_, but not as understanding it, but by _feeling_ it. The feeling is the direct experience, and the understanding of it is the concept the perceiver constructs based in what is felt. _Feel_ does not refer to emotions, but to anything that impresses the senses (sensing). The reason the perceiver constructs an understanding of what is felt, is because if, instead, feeling instantly goes to action, the perceiver would be deceived and would severely increase the probability of being terminated. A child may be able to sense Santa Clause is real, because he is standing right there at Christmas. The child has more sensing than conceptual modelling and thus acts on appearance.



A note on the child's realization of the deception of Santa Clause: The parents introduces deception into the comfort zone of the child, where, to the child, things are exactly as they appear. Sensation can be trusted to reflect reality as it is. When the deception of Santa Clause is realized, the child has to divorce itself from sensation as reliable source, and start understand things, like _Santa Clause_, as conceptual models being more complex than the mere felt appearances. Felt appearances of the _real_ now become constitutents of a conceptual model (within the _structure of things_), which the now older child primarily relates to, and thus, and the emergent conceptual identity of _Santa Clause_ as "roleplay" now takes precedence, whereas the child relates to the appearance, not by astonishment, but by perhaps scorn, like ("I know who you are"). The beneficial action of not relating to _Santa Clause_ as real is a result, not of relating to mere appearance of the _real_ but by primarily relating to the conceptual model. _Santa Clause_ is _self-evident_ as a deception, because the presence of _Santa Clause_ contains all that is needed to fully understand it. The _thing_ itself is self-evident, and doesn't need our description, but the perceiver needs the description (a good conceptual model) to recognize the self-evident nature of the _thing_.



There is no such thing as "perceiving reality as it is", and especially not by removing conceptual models and only attend to sensation. There are good and bad conceptual models, but there is no reality beneath all models that can meaningfully be concieved of in absense of concepts. Focusing only on sensation, however, can increase the awareness of the feedback from the assumed _real_. This feedback comes to inform the construction of conceptual models.



The perceiver sources the _real_ for fragments to build conceptual models lending predictable favourable outcome when related to as basis for choice and action.



That means: all things can be seen to represent the structure described here, regardless if this structure is described here or not.



#### Structured perception determines a things existence



A thing exists when it is percieved. If not percieved, we can not know it exists. An object in the other room does not exist, but the sense it does is based on an assumption, perhaps because we were in the room 1 minute earlier. A thing comes into existence and goes out of existence, as it comes and goes out of perception. We can not percieve that it does exist, while we do not percieve it. (There is only things as perceived).



This refers to the felt appearance of the _real_ of the thing. We know there is a felt appearance, when we perceive it. We do not know if that felt appearance is still there, if we do not somehow feel it (percieve it).



#### Self-creating/defining



A thing, as a particular thing, is perceived based on perception being structured to percieve it. Perception being structured differently, yields a different thing being percieved. The thing is to the perceiver as it is perceived, but its basis in the _real_ is what it self-evidently is. The perceiver may not construct an understanding of the _thing_ that correctly relates to the _real_. An "inacurate" perception would be its own _thing_ (its own understanding). Those are things, conceptual models, in that they come to be influential as exactly those things to person perceiving them. Based on perception, the thing is determined useful to a degree, and the person will make choice, attempting the better outcome as determined by the persons idea of what is desirable.



A thing comes into perception of the perceiver as to the degree it is useful, and comes into perception in an useful way (preferably). Therefore, not all things matter. This ontology is not concerned with for example a distant star you do not perceive, because if that would matter, then every posibility in eternity would matter. A distant star could matter to an astronomer, because he or she can perceive it and deems it useful to study).



### Thing properties



Note: _Structure of Things_ does not make metaphysical claims about reality-as-such. It describes how things are formed in differentiated perception, and how these structures emerge in relation to the perceiver. Then, a thing is always perceived differentiated, discerned. A non-differentiated, non-discerned thing can not be perceived. The _constraint_ is that all things are based in differentiated perception. Perception includes both sensations and concepts. Sensation is directly knonw, or one would not have an incentive to remove the hand from a hot stove. Conceptual models are also directly known, as such, meaning it is the conceptual model that is directly known, as it impresses cognition, but what the concept refers to, is not directly known, only indirectly trough the concept. A cellphone is a conceptual model and the item it refers to is not directly known. However, the weight of the cellphone can be directly sensed and thus directly known. Material is directly known, but what that material means to us, is only a conceptual model that refers to a thing which we deem have the identity and meaning of the conceptual model. Gravity is not known as "gravity". The concept "gravity" is not directly known. However, the pull of the earth can be felt and directly known regardless of our language, thoughts and concepts.



Because of differentiated perception being the constraint of any thing:



- A thing is what it is not.

  - The color blue is not red, not tall, not loud, not magnetic. When we remove all things we know blue is not, then we see that what remains is the quality of blue. Thus, the color blue is blue.

- A thing is not non-existing, because a non-existing thing is different from the thing. Blue can not be blue, if blue does not exist.

- A thing is immutable, in that it can not change and still be the same thing.

- A thing is a particular thing, it is not another thing.

- A things existence is contingent on perception. If a thing is not perceived, it is not a thing. If a thing is perceived, it is a thing.

- A thing must have an identity.