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https://github.com/haskell/hackage-security
Hackage security framework based on TUF (The Update Framework)
https://github.com/haskell/hackage-security
cabal hackage haskell security tuf
Last synced: 30 days ago
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Hackage security framework based on TUF (The Update Framework)
- Host: GitHub
- URL: https://github.com/haskell/hackage-security
- Owner: haskell
- Created: 2015-04-30T15:46:57.000Z (over 9 years ago)
- Default Branch: master
- Last Pushed: 2024-04-04T05:47:44.000Z (7 months ago)
- Last Synced: 2024-04-15T08:17:49.597Z (7 months ago)
- Topics: cabal, hackage, haskell, security, tuf
- Language: Haskell
- Homepage: http://hackage.haskell.org/package/hackage-security
- Size: 1.19 MB
- Stars: 56
- Watchers: 19
- Forks: 47
- Open Issues: 53
-
Metadata Files:
- Readme: README.md
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README
# Hackage Security [](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/hackage-security) [](https://www.stackage.org/package/hackage-security)
This is a library for Hackage security based on [TUF, The Update
Framework][TUF]. In addition to the TUF website, the [blog post][blogpost] that
announced the framework is a good source of information.
## Background Information
The Hackage security process is an implementation of [_The Update Framework_
(TUF)][TUF], intended to stop software supply-chain attacks. TUF provides both
index signing, which prevents mirrors or other middlemen from tampering with the
contents of a software repository, and author signing, which prevents
repositories from tampering with the contents of hosted packages. Thus far,
however, Hackage implements only index signing. Additionally, Hackage differs
somewhat from TUF's assumptions, and thus does things a little differently.
Rather than attempting to describe the diff against TUF, this document simply
describes how Hackage's security features work.
As an instance of TUF, the Hackage security process uses much of its jargon. In
particular, a _role_ refers to a manner of use of a particular key. A given key
might, in principle, be used in multiple roles - for instance, the same key
could be used to sign timestamps and mirrors. In this context, "the timestamp
key" and "the mirror key" would refer to the same key used in two different
ways. Each role is assigned a _threshold_ that states how many signatures are
expected for a given role. For instance, in Hackage, the timestamp role requires
just one signature, while the root role requires three signatures. Similarly,
keys are distinguished from key IDs, which are hashes of the key content. With
the `ed25519` keys used by this process, they are the same length, so be
careful.
Hackage provides the following to build tools:
* An index, which contains the metadata for every package
* Packages, which contain the actual code
* A timestamp, with a frequently-updated signature that expires regularly
Malicious mirrors could attempt to interpose incorrect information into either.
Hackage cryptographically signs the index, providing evidence of its
authenticity, and the index itself contains hashes of each package file. Thus,
mirrors cannot interpose new metadata or new packages, because both are secured
by the signature. Additionally, these features prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks against both Hackage and its mirrors, domain hijacking, and rollback
attacks. The signed timestamp ensures that clients can detect replay attacks
that are denying them new packages. They do not prevent malicious or
compromised package authors from uploading malware to the index, nor do they
protect against the Hackage server itself being compromised.
## Brief overview of Hackage and cabal-install
Hackage makes all packages available from a single directory `/package`; for
example, version 1.0 of package Foo is available at `/package/Foo-1.0.tar.gz`
(see [Footnote: Paths](#paths)).
Additionally, Hackage offers a tarball, variously known as “the
index” or “the index tarball”, located at `/00-index.tar.gz`.
The index tarball contains the `.cabal` for all packages available on the
server; `cabal-install` downloads this file whenever you call `cabal update` to
figure out which packages are available, and it uses this file when you `cabal
install` a package to figure out which dependencies to install. The `.cabal`
file for Foo-1.0 is located at `Foo/1.0/Foo.cabal` in the index. (One side goal
of the Hackage Security project is to make downloading the index incremental.)
Note that although Hackage additionally offers the (latest version of) the
`.cabal` file at `/package/Foo-1.0/Foo.cabal`, this is never used by
`cabal-install`.
In order to distinguish between paths on the server and paths in the index we
will qualify them as `/package/Foo-1.0.tar.gz` and
`/Foo/1.0/Foo.cabal` respectively, both informally in this text and in
formal delegation rules.
## Formats and Tools
The files that are to be signed contain JSON objects that have two fields:
`signatures` and `signed`. The Hackage signing tools will not sign any other
format. The `signatures` field is expected to be an array of signatures, while
the `signed` field may consist of arbitrary JSON. When signing, the signature
is actually applied to the [canonical
JSON](https://gibson042.github.io/canonicaljson-spec/) rendering of the contents
of the `signed` field. This allows multiple signatures to be independently
created and added, because new signatures do not sign the prior signatures.
There are two tools that are relevant:
[hackage-root-tool](https://github.com/haskell/hackage-security/tree/master/hackage-root-tool)
and
[hackage-repo-tool](https://github.com/haskell/hackage-security/tree/master/hackage-repo-tool).
`hackage-root-tool` is a minimal implementation of the cryptography, intended to
be as small as possible so that it can be audited and run on an offline machine.
`hackage-repo-tool`, on the other hand, has a number of features for managing
file-based Hackage repositories in addition to signing.
## Keys and Participants
### The Root of Trust
The file `root.json` describes all of the keys used in Hackage Security. It
lists the public parts of the keys, enumerates the roles used, and assigns keys
and thresholds to each role. It is signed by keys in the root role.
### Root Keys
The Hackage root keys are held by trusted members of the Haskell community. A
signature is valid when three keyholders have signed. This means that the
overall system is not vulnerable to a single key being compromised; nor can
service be denied by a single key being lost. Keyholders are strongly
encouraged to keep their keys very secure. The current collection of
keyholders, plus signatures that demonstrate that they have the keys, is
available at https://github.com/haskell-infra/hackage-root-keys .
Root keys present a bootstrapping problem: how is a build tool to know whether
it should trust a newly-downloaded `root.json`? To work around this, the public
part of the root keys and the threshold policy for the root role are shipped
with the build tools that need to verify Hackage downloads. Once this
`root.json` has been verified, its policies override the built-in bootstrapping
keys.
Because these root keys are so difficult to replace, they are not used for
operations. The root keys are used to delegate roles to a set of operational
keys, and these operational keys are used for the daily signing of indices by
Hackage.
### Operational Keys
The operational keys are signed by the root keys. Build tools have no in-built
knowledge of them, but can instead discover them through `root.json`. The
operational private keys are kept secure by the Hackage administrators, but
because they are on an online machine, they are more vulnerable than the root
keys.
Operational keys fulfill two roles:
* **Snapshot keys** are used to sign the Hackage index.
* **Timestamp keys** are used to sign the frequently-updated timestamp file.
## Mirrors
A list of authorized mirrors of Hackage is provided in a file called
`mirrors.json`. This list is signed by the mirror key. The mirrors list
expires annually and must be re-signed by the mirror key. Clients check that
the mirror key is signed by the root key, and that the mirror list is signed by
the mirror key, before accepting a mirror list. According to the [TUF
spec](https://theupdateframework.github.io/specification/latest/#mirrors),
> The importance of using signed mirror lists depends on the application and the users of that application. There is minimal risk to the application’s security from being tricked into contacting the wrong mirrors. This is because the framework has very little trust in repositories.
The mirror list being signed is mostly for the sake of completeness, rather than out of concern for a particular threat.
## Comparison with TUF
In this section we highlight some of the differences in the specifics of the
implementation; generally we try to follow the TUF model as closely as
possible.
This section is not (currently) intended to be complete.
### Targets
In the current proposal we do not yet implement author signing, but when we do
implement author signing we want to have a smooth transition, and moreover we
want to be able to have a mixture of packages, some of which are author signed
and some of which are not. That is, package authors must be able to opt-in to
author signing (or not).
#### Unsigned packages
##### Package specific metadata
The package metadata files (“target files”) will be stored _in the
index_. The metadata for Foo 1.0 will be stored in
`/Foo/1.0/package.json`, and will contain the hash and size of the
package tarball:
``` javascript
{ "signed" : {
"_type" : "Targets"
, "version" : VERSION
, "expires" : never
, "targets" : { "/package/Foo-1.0.tar.gz" : FILEINFO }
}
, "signatures" : []
}
```
Note that expiry dates are relevant only for information that we expect to
change over time (such as the snapshot). Since packages are immutable, they
cannot expire. (Additionally, there is no point adding an expiry date to files
that are protected only the snapshot key, as the snapshot _itself_ will expire).
It is not necessary to list the file info of the `.cabal` files here: `.cabal`
files are listed by value in the index tarball, and are therefore already
protected by the snapshot key (but see [author signing](#author-signing)).
##### Delegation
[Conceptually speaking](#phase1-shortcuts) we then need a top-level target file
`/targets.json` that contains the required delegation information:
``` javascript
{ "signed" : {
"_type" : Targets
, "version" : VERSION
, "expires" : never
, "targets" : []
, "delegations" : {
"keys" : []
, "roles" : [
{ "name" : "/$NAME/$VERSION/package.json"
, "keyids" : []
, "threshold" : 0
, "path" : "/package/$NAME-$VERSION.tar.gz"
}
]
}
}
, "signatures" : /* target keys */
}
```
This file itself is signed by the target keys (kept offline by the Hackage
admins).
Note that this file uses various extensions to TUF spec:
* We can use wildcards in names as well as in paths. This means that we list a
single path with a single replacement name. (Alternatively, we
could have a list of pairs of paths and names.)
* Paths contain namespaces (`` versus ``)
* Wildcards have more structure than TUF provides for.
The first one of these is the most important, as it has some security
implications; see comments below.
New unsigned packages, as well as new versions of existing unsigned packages,
can be uploaded to Hackage without any intervention from the Hackage admins (the
offline target keys are not required).
##### Security
This setup is sufficient to allow for untrusted mirrors: since they do not have
access to the snapshot key, they (or a man-in-the-middle) cannot change which
packages are visible or change the packages themselves.
However, since the snapshot key is stored on the server, if the server itself is
compromised almost all security guarantees are void.
#### Signed packages
We sketch the design here only, we do not actually intend to implement this yet
in phase 1 of the project.
##### Package specific metadata
As for unsigned packages, we keep metadata specific for each package version.
Unlike for unsigned packages, however, we store two files: one that can be
signed by the package author, and one that can be signed by the Hackage
trustees, who can upload new `.cabal` file revisions but not change the
package contents.
As before we still have `/Foo/1.0/package.json` containing
``` javascript
{ "signed" : {
"_type" : "Targets"
, "version" : VERSION
, "expires" : never
, "targets" : { "/package/Foo-1.0.tar.gz" : FILEINFO }
}
, "signatures" : /* signatures from package authors */
}
```
It is not necessary to separately sign the `.cabal` file that is listed _inside_
the package `.tar.gz` file. However, this `.cabal` file may not match the one in
the index, either because a Hackage trustee uploaded a revision, or because of
an malicious attempt to fool the solver in installing different dependencies
than intended.
Therefore, unlike for unsigned packages, listing the file info for the `.cabal`
file in the index is useful for signed packages: although the `.cabal` files are
listed by value in the index tarball, the index is only signed by the snapshot
key. We may want to additionally check that the `.cabal` are properly author
signed too. We record this in a different file `/Foo/1.0/revisions.json`,
which can be signed by either the package authors or the Hackage trustees.
``` javascript
{ "signed" : {
"_type" : "Targets"
, "version" : VERSION
, "expires" : never
, "targets" : { "/Foo/1.0/Foo.cabal" : FILEINFO }
}
, "signatures" : /* signatures from package authors or Hackage trustees */
}
```
##### Delegation
Delegation for signed packages is a bit more complicated. We extend the
top-level targets file to
``` javascript
{ "signed" : {
"_type" : Targets
, "version" : VERSION
, "expires" : EXPIRES
, "targets" : []
, "delegations" : {
"keys" : /* Hackage trustee keys */
, "roles" : [
// Delegation for unsigned packages
{ "name" : "/$NAME/$VERSION/package.json"
, "keyids" : []
, "threshold" : 0
, "path" : "/package/$NAME-$VERSION.tar.gz"
}
// Delegation for package Bar
, { "name" : "/Bar/authors.json"
, "keyids" : /* top-level target keys */
, "threshold" : THRESHOLD
, "path" : "/package/Bar-$VERSION.tar.gz"
}
, { "name" : "/Bar/authors.json"
, "keyids" : /* top-level target keys */
, "threshold" : THRESHOLD
, "path" : "/Bar/$VERSION/Bar.cabal"
}
, { "name" : "/Bar/$VERSION/revisions.json"
, "keyids" : /* Hackage trustee key IDs */
, "threshold" : THRESHOLD
, "path" : "/Bar/$VERSION/Bar.cabal"
}
// .. delegation for other signed packages ..
]
}
}
, "signatures" : /* target keys */
}
```
Since this lists all signed packages, we must list an expiry date here so that
attackers cannot mount freeze attacks (although this is somewhat less of an
issue here as freezing this list would make an entire new package, rather than
a new package version, invisible).
This “middle level” targets file `/Bar/authors.json`
introduces the package author/maintainer keys and contains further delegation
information:
``` javascript
{ "signed" : {
"_type" : "Targets"
, "version" : VERSION
, "expires" : never
, "targets" : {}
, "delegations" : {
"keys" : /* package maintainer keys */
, "roles" : [
{ "name" : "/Bar/$VERSION/package.json"
, "keyids" : /* package maintainer key IDs */
, "threshold" : THRESHOLD
, "path" : "/Bar/$VERSION/Bar-$VERSION.tar.gz"
}
, { "name" : "/Bar/$VERSION/revisions.json"
, "keyids" : /* package maintainer key IDs */
, "threshold" : THRESHOLD
, "path" : "/Bar/$VERSION/Bar.cabal"
}
]
}
, "signatures" : /* signatures from top-level target keys */
}
```
Some notes:
1. When a new signed package is introduced, the Hackage admins need to create
and sign a new `targets.json` that lists the package author keys and
appropriate delegation information, as well as add corresponding entries to
the top-level delegation file. However, once this is done, the Hackage admins
do not need to be involved when package authors wish to upload new versions.
2. When package authors upload a new version, they need to sign only a single
file that contains the information about that particular version.
3. Both package authors (through the package-specific “middle level”
delegation information) and Hackage trustees (through the top-level
delegation information) can sign `.cabal` file revisions, but only authors
can sign the packages themselves.
4. Hackage trustees are listed only in the top-level delegation information, so
when the set of trustees changes we only need to modify one file (as opposed
to each middle-level package delegation information).
5. For signed packages that do not want to allow Hackage trustees to sign
`.cabal` file revisions we can just omit the corresponding entry from the
top-level delegations file.
6. There are two kinds of rule overlaps in these delegation rules:
`/package/Bar-1.0.tar.gz` will match against the rule for unsigned
packages (`/package/$NAME-$VERSION.tar.gz`) and against the rule for
signed packages (`/package/Bar-$VERSION.tar.gz`). It is important
here that the signed rule take precedence, because author signed packages
_must_ be author signed. The priority scheme can be simple: more specific
rules should take precedence (the TUF specification leaves the priority
scheme used open).
The second kind of overlap occurs between the rule
for the `.cabal` file in the the top-level `targets.json` and the
corresponding rule in `authors.json`; in this case both rules match against
precisely the same path (`/Bar/$VERSION/Bar.cabal`), and indeed in
this case there is no priority: as long as either rule matches
(that is, the file is either signed by a package author or by a Hackage
trustee) we're okay.
##### Transition packages from `unsigned` to `signed`
When a package that previously did not opt-in to author signing now wants
author-signing, we just need to add the appropriate entries to the top-level
delegation file and set up the appropriate middle-level delegation information.
##### Security
When the snapshot key is compromised, attackers still do not have access to
package author keys, which are strictly kept offline. However, they can still
mount freeze attacks on packages versions, because there is no file (which is
signed with offline key) listing which versions are available.
We could increase security here by changing the middle-level `authors.json` to
remove the wildcard rule, list all versions explicitly, and change the top-level
delegation information to say that the middle-level file should be signed by
the package authors instead.
Note that we do not use a wildcard for signed packages in the top-level
`targets.json` for a similar reason: by listing all packages that we expect to
be signed explicitly, we have a list of signed packages which is signed by
offline keys (in this case, the target keys).
### Snapshot
#### Interaction with the index tarball
According to the official specification we should have a file `snapshot.json`,
signed with the snapshot key, which lists the hashes of _all_ metadata files in
the repo. In Hackage however we have the index tarball, which _contains_ most of
the metadata files in the repo (that is, it contains all the `.cabal` files, but
it also contains all the various `.json` files). The only thing that is missing
from the index tarball, compared to the `snapshot.json` file from the TUF spec,
is the version, expiry time, and signatures. Therefore our `snapshot.json` looks
like
``` javascript
{ "signed" : {
"_type" : "Snapshot"
, "version" : VERSION
, "expires" : EXPIRES
, "meta" : {
"root.json" : FILEINFO
, "mirrors.json" : FILEINFO
, "index.tar" : FILEINFO
, "index.tar.gz" : FILEINFO
}
}
, "signatures" : /* signatures from snapshot key */
}
```
Then the combination of `snapshot.json` together with the index tarball is
a strict superset of the information in TUF's `snapshot.json` (instead of
containing the hashes of the metadata in the repo, it contains the actual
metadata themselves).
We list the file info of the root and mirrors metadata explicitly, rather than
recording it in the index tarball, so that we can check them for updates during
the update process (section 5.1, “The Client Application”, of the
TUF spec) without downloading the entire index tarball.
### Out-of-tarball targets
All versions of all packages are listed, along with their full `.cabal` file, in
the Hackage index. This is useful because the constraint solver needs most of
this information anyway. However, when we add additional kinds of targets we may
not wish to add these to the index: people who are not interested in these new
targets should not, or only minimally, be affected. In particular, new releases
of these new kinds of targets should not result in a linear increase in what
clients who are not interested in these targets need to download whenever they
call `cabal install`.
To support these out-of-tarball targets we can use the regular TUF setup. Since
the index does not serve as an exhaustive list of which targets (and which
target versions) are available, it becomes important to have target metadata
that list all targets exhaustively, to avoid freeze attacks. The file
information (hash and filesize) of all these target metadata files must, by the
TUF spec, be listed in the top-level snapshot; we should thus avoid introducing
too many of them (in particular, we should avoid requiring a new metadata file
for each new version of a particular kind of target).
It is important to store OOT targets under a different prefix than `/package` to
avoid name clashes.
#### Collections
[Package collections][CabalHell1] are a new Hackage feature that's [currently in
development][ZuriHac]. We want package collections to be signed, just like
anything else.
Like packages, collections are versioned and immutable, so we have
```
collection/StackageNightly-2015.06.02.collection
collection/StackageNightly-2015.06.03.collection
collection/StackageNightly-...
collection/DebianJessie-...
collection/...
```
As for packages, collections should be able to opt-in for author signing (once
we support author signing), but we should also support not-author-signed
(“unsigned”) collections. Moreover, it should be possible for people
to create new unsigned collections without the involvement of the Hackage
admins. This rules out listing all collections explicitly in the top-level
`targets.json` (which is signed with offline target keys).
Below we sketch a possible design (we may want to tweak this further).
##### Unsigned collections
For unsigned collections we add a single delegation rule to the top-level
`targets.json`:
``` javascript
{ "name" : "/collection/collections.json"
, "keyids" : /* snapshot key */
, "threshold" : 1
, "path" : "/collection/$NAME-$VERSION.collection"
}
```
The middle-level `collections.json`, signed with the snapshot role, lists
delegation rules for all available collections:
``` javascript
[ { "name" : "/collection/StackageNightly.json"
, "keyids" : /* snapshot key */
, "threshold" : 1
, "path" : "/collection/StackageNightly-$VERSION.collection"
}
, { "name" : "/collection/DebianJessie.json"
, "keyids" : /* snapshot key */
, "threshold" : 1
, "path" : "/collection/DebianJessie-$VERSION.collection"
}
, ...
]
```
where `StackageNightly` and `DebianJessie` are two package collection (the
[Stackage Nightly][StackageNightly] collection and the set of Haskell package
distributed with the [Debian Jessie][DebianJessie] Linux distribution).
The final per-collection targets metadata finally lists all versions:
``` javascript
{ "signed" : {
"_type" : "Targets"
, "version" : VERSION
, "expires" : /* expiry */
, "targets" : {
"/collection/StackageNightly-2015.06.02.collection" : FILEINFO
, "/collection/StackageNightly-2015.06.03.collection" : FILEINFO
, ...
}
}
, "signatures" : /* signed with snapshot role */
}
```
Since we cannot rely on the index to have the list of all version we must list
all versions explicitly here rather than using wildcards. Note that this means
that the snapshot will get a new entry for each new collection introduced, but
not for each new _version_ of each collection.
##### Author-signed collections
For author-signed collections we only need to make a single change. Suppose that
the `DebianJessie` collection is signed. Then we move the rule for
`DebianJessie` from `collection/collections.json` and instead list it in the
top-level `targets.json` (as for packages, introducing a signed collection
necessarily requires the involvement of the Hackage admins):
``` javascript
{ "name" : "/collection/DebianJessie.json"
, "keyids" : /* DebianJessie maintainer keys */
, "threshold" : /* threshold */
, "path" : "/collection/DebianJessie-$VERSION.collection"
}
```
No other changes are required (apart from of course that
`/collection/DebianJessie.json` will now be signed with the
`DebianJessie` maintainer keys rather than the snapshot key). As for packages,
this requires a priority scheme for delegation rules.
(One difference between this scheme and the scheme we use for packages is that
this means that the top-level `targets.json` file lists all keys for all
collection authors. If we want to avoid that we need a further level of
indirection.)
Note that in a sense author-signed collections are snapshots of the server. As
such, it would be good if these collections listed the file info (hashes and
filesizes) of the packages the collection.
## Project phases and shortcuts
Phase 1 of the project will implement the basic TUF framework, but leave out
author signing; support for author signed packages (and other targets) will
added in phase 2.
### Shortcuts taken in phase 1 (aka TODOs for phase 2)
This list is currenty not exhaustive.
#### Core library
* Although the infrastructure is in place for [target metadata][Targetshs],
including typed data types representing [pattern matches and
replacements][Patternshs], we have not yet actually implementing target
delegation proper. We don't need to: we only support one kind of target
(not-author-signed packages), and we know statically where the target
information for packages can be found (in `/package/version/targets.json`).
This is currently hardcoded.
Once we have author signing we need a proper implementation of delegation,
including a priority scheme between rules. This will also involve lazily
downloading additional target metadata.
* Out-of-tarballs targets are not yet implemented. The main difficulty here is
that they require a proper implementation of delegation; once that is done
(required anyway for author signing) support for OOT targets should be
straightforward.
#### Integration in `cabal-install`
* The cabal integration uses the `hackage-security` library to check for updates
(that is, update the local copy of the index) and to download packages
(verifying the downloaded file against the file info that was recorded in
the package metadata, which itself is stored in the index). However, it does
not use the library to get a list of available packages, nor to access
`.cabal` files.
Once we have author signing however we may want to do additional checks:
* We should look at the top-level `targets.json` file (in addition to the
index) to figure out which packages are available. (The top-level targets
file, signed by offline keys, will enumerate all author-signed packages.)
* If we do allow package authors to sign list of package versions (as detailed
above) we should use these “middle level” target files to figure
out which versions are available for these packages.
* We might want to verify the `.cabal` files to make sure that they match the
file info listed in the now author-signed metadata.
Therefore `cabal-install` should be modified to go through the
`hackage-security` library get the list of available packages, package
versions, and to access the actual `.cabal` files.
## Open questions / TODOs
* The set of maintainers of a package can change over time, and can even change
so much that the old maintainers of a package are no longer maintainters.
But we would still like to be able to install and verify old packages. How
do we deal with this?
## Ongoing Maintenance
### Mirror Keys: Every Year
The mirror list requires annual resigning by a holder of a mirror key.
To do this, use the following steps:
1. Install `hackage-root-tool` on the signing machine and ensure that the key is present.
2. Create a new `mirrors.json` file by incrementing the version field of the existing file and adding a year to the expiration date. Delete the signature(s), replacing them with an empty array. Place the file on the signing machine.
3. Sign the file using `hackage-root-tool sign KEY mirrors.json`, and place the resulting signature array into the `signatures` field of `mirrors.json`.
4. Commit the updated file to `https://github.com/haskell-infra/hackage-root-keys` and inform the Hackage admins so they can install it.
### Root Data: Every Other Year
The holders of the root keys are, each year, signing the root information file `root.json` that directs clients to the operational and mirror keys.
The keyholders are attesting that they believe that the root and operational keys are not compromised, that Hackage is still under the control of trusted administrators, and that everything is working about the way it usually does.
Today, there are five active root keys, because three of the original eight never completed the setup process.
To prepare the updated `roots.json` for signing by the root keyholders, a coordinator should perform the following edits:
1. If any new keys are to be admitted, collect their key IDs and add them to the `keys` field.
2. Modify the expiration date.
3. Increment the `version` field.
4. Delete the existing signatures.
Each holder of root keys should do the following:
1. Verify that the contents of `root.json` are correct. Any changes to the set of keys and their roles or to the threshold policies should be trustworthy, and any new keyholders need to have their identity verified. Please be a stickler for details here.
2. Install `hackage-root-tool` on the signing machine and ensure that the key is present.
3. Place the updated `roots.json` file on the signing machine.
4. Sign the file using `hackage-root-tool sign KEY roots.json`, and send the resulting signature back to the person who is coordinating the signing.
Finally, the coordinator should insert the provided signatures and commit the updated file to `https://github.com/haskell-infra/hackage-root-keys` and inform the Hackage admins so they can install it.
### Operational Keys
The operational keys do not presently require regeneration, unless the private keys have been lost or compromised.
## Footnotes
### Footnote: Paths
The situation with paths in cabal/hackage is a bit of a mess. In this footnote
we describe the situation before the work on the Hackage Security library.
#### The index tarball
The index tarball contains paths of the form
```
//.cabal
```
For example:
```
mtl/1.0/mtl.cabal
```
as well as a single top-level `preferred-versions` file.
#### Package resources offered by Hackage
Hackage offers a number of resources for package tarballs: one
“official” one and a few redirects.
1. The official location of package tarballs on a Hackage server is
```
/package//.tar.gz
```
for example
```
/package/mtl-2.2.1/mtl-2.2.1.tar.gz
```
(This was the official location from [very early on][63a8c728]).
2. It [provides a redirect][3cfe4de] for
```
/package/.tar.gz
```
for example
```
/package/mtl-2.2.1.tar.gz
```
(that is, a request for `/package/mtl-2.2.1.tar.gz` will get a 301 Moved
Permanently response, and is redirected to
`/package/mtl-2.2.1/mtl-2.2.1.tar.gz`).
3. It provides a redirect for Hackage-1 style URLs of the form
```
/packages/archive///.tar.gz
```
for example
```
/packages/archive/mtl/2.2.1/mtl-2.2.1.tar.gz
```
#### Locations used by cabal-install to find packages
There are two kinds of repositories supported by `cabal-install`: local and
remote.
1. For a local repository `cabal-install` looks for packages at
```
///.tar.gz
```
2. For remote repositories however `cabal-install` looks for packages in one of
two locations.
a. If the remote repository (``) is
`http://hackage.haskell.org/packages/archive` (this value is hardcoded)
then it looks for the package at
///.tar.gz
b. For any other repository it looks for the package at
/package/.tar.gz
Some notes:
1. Files downloaded from a remote repository are cached locally as
```
///.tar.gz
```
I.e., the layout of the local cache matches the layout of a local
repository (and matches the structure of the index tarball too).
2. Somewhat bizarrely, when `cabal-install` creates a new initial `config`
file it uses `http://hackage.haskell.org/packages/archive` as the repo base
URI (even in newer versions of `cabal-install`; this was [changed only very
recently][bfeb01f]).
3. However, notice that _even when we give `cabal` a “new-style”
URI_ the address used by `cabal` _still_ causes a redirect (from
`/package/.tar.gz` to
`/package//.tar.gz`).
The most important observation however is the following: **It is not possible to
serve a local repository as a remote repository** (by pointing a web server at a
local repository) because the layouts are completely different. (Note that the
location of packages on Hackage-1 _did_ match the layout of local repositories,
but that doesn't help because the _only_ repository that `cabal-install` will
regard as a Hackage-1 repository is one hosted on `hackage.haskell.org`).
[TUF]: http://theupdateframework.com/
[CabalHell1]: http://www.well-typed.com/blog/2014/09/how-we-might-abolish-cabal-hell-part-1/
[ZuriHac]: http://www.well-typed.com/blog/2015/06/cabal-hackage-hacking-at-zurihac/
[StackageNightly]: http://www.stackage.org/
[DebianJessie]: https://wiki.debian.org/DebianJessie
[Targetshs]: https://github.com/well-typed/hackage-security/blob/master/hackage-security/src/Hackage/Security/TUF/Targets.hs
[Patternshs]: https://github.com/well-typed/hackage-security/blob/master/hackage-security/src/Hackage/Security/TUF/Patterns.hs
[bfeb01f]: https://github.com/haskell/cabal/commit/bfeb01f
[63a8c728]: https://github.com/haskell/hackage-server/commit/63a8c728
[3cfe4de]: https://github.com/haskell/hackage-server/commit/3cfe4de
[blogpost]: https://www.well-typed.com/blog/2015/07/hackage-security-alpha/