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https://github.com/ovh/symmecrypt

Golang symmetric encryption library
https://github.com/ovh/symmecrypt

aead aes aes-gcm chacha20-poly1305 cryptography golang golang-library symmetric-cryptography

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Golang symmetric encryption library

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# symmecrypt

*symmecrypt* is a symmetric encryption toolsuite.
It provides recommended implementations of crypto algorithms and facilities around configuration management
and encryption key lifecycle.

[![GoDoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/ovh/symmecrypt?status.svg)](https://godoc.org/github.com/ovh/symmecrypt) [![Go Report Card](https://goreportcard.com/badge/github.com/ovh/symmecrypt)](https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/ovh/symmecrypt)

## Overview

* [*symmecrypt*](https://github.com/ovh/symmecrypt): Symmetrical encryption with MAC. Built-in cipher implementations provided, but extensible. Also provides a keyring mechanism for easy key rollover.
* [*symmecrypt/seal*](https://github.com/ovh/symmecrypt/tree/master/seal): Encryption through a symmetric key split in shards (shamir)
* [*symmecrypt/keyloader*](https://github.com/ovh/symmecrypt/tree/master/keyloader): Configuration manager that loads symmecrypt compatible keys from configuration, and supports key *seal* and *hot-reloading*.

## Dependencies

* [*configstore*](https://github.com/ovh/configstore): *symmecrypt/seal* and *symmecrypt/keyloader* provide configuration management facilities, that rely on the *configstore* library. It provides file system, in memory sources, as well as data source abstraction (*providers*), so that any piece of code can easily bridge it with its own configuration management.

## Example

```go
k, err := keyloader.LoadKey("storage")
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}

encrypted, err := k.Encrypt([]byte("foobar"), []byte("additional"), []byte("mac"), []byte("data"))
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}

// decryption will fail if you do not provide the same additional data
// of course, you can also encrypt/decrypt without additional data
decrypted, err := k.Decrypt(encrypted, []byte("additional"), []byte("mac"), []byte("data"))
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}

// output: foobar
fmt.Println(string(decrypted))
```

## Configuration format

Package `configstore` is used for sourcing and managing key configuration values.

```go
// before loading a key by its identifier, package `configstore` needs to
// be configured so it knows about possible configuration sources
//
// this would load keys from a file named "key.txt" that contains a key with
// the identifier "storage":
configstore.File("key.txt")
// more options can be found here: https://github.com/ovh/configstore
k, err := keyloader.LoadKey("storage")
```

`symmecrypt` looks for items in the config store that are of key `encryption-key`, its value is expected to be a JSON string containing the key itself.

If loading from a text file this would look like:

```
- key: encryption-key
value: '{"identifier":"storage","cipher":"aes-gcm","timestamp":1559309532,"key":"b6a942c0c0c75cc87f37d9e880c440ac124e040f263611d9d236b8ed92e35521"}'
```

or when done in code:

```go
item := configstore.NewItem("encryption-key", `{"identifier":"storage","cipher":"aes-gcm","timestamp":1559309532,"key":"b6a942c0c0c75cc87f37d9e880c440ac124e040f263611d9d236b8ed92e35521"}`, 0)
```

## Key rollover

It is important to be able to easily rollover keys when doing symmetric encryption.

For that, one needs to be able to keep decrypting old ciphertexts using the old key,
while encrypting new entries with a new, different key.

Then, the old ciphertexts should all be re-encrypted using the new key.

*symmecrypt* + *symmecrypt/keyloader* make that easy, by providing a keyring / composite key implementation that encrypts with the latest key, while decrypting with *any* key of the keyring.

Encryption keys are fetched from the configuration, and are expected to have the following format:
```
encryption-key: {"cipher":"aes-gcm","key":"442fca912da8309613542e7bb29788a44c162cde6ee4f0f5b1322132f65a2ddc","identifier":"storage","timestamp":1522138216}
encryption-key: {"cipher":"aes-gcm","key":"49a9bc2774e7976c44f4bb6e1e3e6fc70e629be5923a511c8187b72bdc8f848c","identifier":"storage","timestamp":1522138240}

```
With this configuration, the previous example code would automatically instantiate a composite key through *keyloader.LoadKey()*, and be able to decrypt using either key, while all new encryptions would use the timestamp == 1522138240 key.

## Seal

If you do not want to rely on the confidentiality of your configuration to protect your encryption keys, you can *seal* them.

*symmecrypt/seal* provides encryption through a symmetric key which is split in several shards (shamir algorithm). The number of existing shards and the minimum threshold needed to unlock the seal can be configured when first generating it.

*symmecrypt/keyloader* uses *symmecrypt/seal* to generate and load encryption keys which are themselves encrypted. This is controlled via the *sealed* boolean property in a key configuration.

When generating a key via *symmecrypt/keyloader.GenerateKey*, use *sealed* = true. This will use the singleton global instance of the *symmecrypt/seal* package to directly seal the key.

When loading a key via *symmecrypt/keyloader.LoadKey*, the returned key will automatically decrypt itself and become usable as soon as the singleton global instance of *symmecrypt/seal* becomes unsealed (human operation).

A sealed encryption key is unusable on its own, which makes your configuration less at risk. Additionally, the metadata of the key (identifier, timestamp, cipher...) are passed as additional MAC data when encrypting/decrypting the key, preventing any alteration.

```
seal: {"min": 2, "total": 3, "nonce": "9cce8734c707881b1b00d24c3d9cee13"} // Seal definition
encryption-key: {"cipher":"aes-gcm","key":"3414e0524c6a52018849b562b74e611748caf842dd653abc53469c986993f79d4406c662a1a7a9bef141ea88e0464e5bd79857f496418df81bb19ec391174af1d956603c7b8c2825a528972610b25483601c3083ef14c62c31e04f69","identifier":"storage","sealed":true,"timestamp":1522138887}
encryption-key: {"cipher":"aes-gcm","key":"52ef448282bfbdaedcbda970a54b8626ef97a58ffc5489897554c8cba85cf4001d93b23751aaffb5ef2175192bb83ee7c0568634e8d0c7e4ae39f5102402d984220c64d4c6450b034b841844be818a6c5b0ef9016d92b9de1de5408c","identifier":"storage","sealed":true,"timestamp":1522138924}

```

These keys can be generated via *symmecrypt/keyloader.GenerateKey()*, and are recognized and correctly instantiated by *symmecrypt/keyloader.LoadKey()*.

## Supporting your old crypto code

If you want to start using *symmecrypt* but currently depend on another different implementation, no worries.
*symmecrypt* supports custom types/ciphers. You can register a named factory via *symmecrypt.RegisterCipher()*, which has to return an object respecting the *symmecrypt.Key* interface, and will be invoked by *symmecrypt/keyloader* when this cipher is specified in a key configuration.
That way, you can bridge your old code painlessly, and can get rid of the compatibility bridge once you rollover your encrypted data.

Or you can also decide to keep your own Key implementation, and use it through the keyloader that way.

Note: no matter its cipher (built-in or extended), a key can optionally be sealed without additional logic, this is all handled by *symmecrypt/keyloader* itself.

```
seal: {"min": 2, "total": 3, "nonce": "9cce8734c707881b1b00d24c3d9cee13"} // Seal definition
encryption-key: {"cipher":"old-aes-algo","key":"3414e0524c6a52018849b562b74e611748caf842dd653abc53469c986993f79d4406c662a1a7a9bef141ea88e0464e5bd79857f496418df81bb19ec391174af1d956603c7b8c2825a528972610b25483601c3083ef14c62c31e04f69","identifier":"storage","sealed":true,"timestamp":1522138887}
encryption-key: {"cipher":"aes-gcm","key":"52ef448282bfbdaedcbda970a54b8626ef97a58ffc5489897554c8cba85cf4001d93b23751aaffb5ef2175192bb83ee7c0568634e8d0c7e4ae39f5102402d984220c64d4c6450b034b841844be818a6c5b0ef9016d92b9de1de5408c","identifier":"storage","sealed":true,"timestamp":1522138924}

```

```go
symmecrypt.RegisterCipher("old-aes-algo", OldAESFactory)

k, err := keyloader.LoadKey("storage")
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}

encrypted, err := k.Encrypt([]byte("foobar"), []byte("additional"), []byte("mac"), []byte("data"))
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}

decrypted, err := k.Decrypt(encrypted, []byte("additional"), []byte("mac"), []byte("data"))
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}

// output: foobar
fmt.Println(string(decrypted))
```

With such a configuration, any of your previous ciphertexts can be read using your old implementation, but any new data will be encrypted using *symmecrypt*'s aes-gcm implementation.

## Available ciphers

*symmecrypt* provides built-in implementations of symmetric authenticated ciphers:

### aes-gcm

Robust | Fast | Proven
--- | --- | ---
:star::star: | :star::star::star: | :star::star::star:

[AES Galois/Counter mode](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/final) (256bits), with built-in authentication.

:exclamation: **Nonces are randomly generated and should not be repeated with *aes-gcm*, remember to rollover your key on a regular basis. Nonce size is 96 bits, which is not ideal for random generation due to the risk of collision, prefer *xchacha20-poly1305*.**

### chacha20-poly1305

Robust | Fast | Proven
--- | --- | ---
:star::star: | :star::star::star: | :star::star:

[ChaCha20-Poly1305](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539), with built-in authentication.

:exclamation: **Nonces are randomly generated and should not be repeated with *chacha20-poly1305*, remember to rollover your key on a regular basis. Nonce size is 96 bits, which is not ideal for random generation due to the risk of collision, prefer *xchacha20-poly1305*.**

### xchacha20-poly1305

Robust | Fast | Proven
--- | --- | ---
:star::star::star: | :star::star::star: | :star::star:

Variant of [ChaCha20-Poly1305](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539) with extended nonce, with built-in authentication.

:exclamation: **Nonces are randomly generated and should not be repeated with *xchacha20-poly1305*, remember to rollover your key on a regular basis. Nonce size is 192 bits, which is acceptable for random generation.**

### aes-pmac-siv

Robust | Fast | Proven
--- | --- | ---
:star::star::star: | :star::star: | :star:

Parallelized implementation of [AES-SIV](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5297) (256 bits), with built-in authentication.

:exclamation: **This cipher is still young, use with caution.**

:exclamation: **This is one of the rare ciphers which is not weak to nonce reuse.**

More information:
* [AES-PMAC-SIV](https://github.com/miscreant/miscreant/wiki/AES-PMAC-SIV)
* [miscreant and the nonce reuse issue](https://tonyarcieri.com/introducing-miscreant-a-multi-language-misuse-resistant-encryption-library)

### hmac

Robust | Fast | Proven
--- | --- | ---
:star::star::star: | :star::star::star: | :star::star::star:

:exclamation: **DOES NOT GUARANTEE CONFIDENTIALITY.**

HMAC-sha512 for authentication only. Note: if the input consists only of printable characters, so will the output.

## Command-line tool

A command-line tool is available as a companion to the library ([source](https://github.com/ovh/symmecrypt/tree/master/cmd/symmecrypt)).

It can be used to generate new random encryption keys for any of the built-in symmecrypt ciphers, and to encrypt/decrypt arbitrary data.

### Example (new key)
```bash
$ symmecrypt new aes-gcm --key=storage_key
{"identifier":"storage_key","cipher":"aes-gcm","timestamp":1538383069,"key":"46ca74bf7a980ffbfdeea5a66593f7a8f12039f872694015e66c44b652165ee4"}
```

### Example (file)
```bash
$ export ENCRYPTION_KEY_BASE64=$(symmecrypt new aes-gcm --base64)
$ symmecrypt encrypt <test.encrypted
foo
bar
baz
EOF
$ cat -e test.encrypted
^^JDM-1^EM-$M-^K1nX;^WM-^HC6^Xw^?^BM-.M-p^[M-%=^M-^ZM-uM-%M-2^H6M-sM-NM-FM-^H^RM-]g^_&$
$ symmecrypt decrypt