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awesome-iam

👤 Identity and Access Management knowledge for cloud platforms
https://github.com/kdeldycke/awesome-iam

Last synced: 3 days ago
JSON representation

  • Overview

    • overview of cloud computing
    • The EnterpriseReady SaaS Feature Guides - The majority of the features making B2B users happy will be implemented by the IAM perimeter.
    • IAM is hard. It's really hard. - “Overly permissive AWS IAM policies that allowed `s3:GetObject` to `*` (all) resources”, led to \$80 million fine for Capital One. The only reason why you can't overlook IAM as a business owner.
    • IAM Is The Real Cloud Lock-In - A little *click-baity*, but author admit that “It depends on how much you trust them to 1. Stay in business; 2. Not jack up your prices; 3. Not deprecate services out from under you; 4. Provide more value to you in business acceleration than they take away in flexibility.”
  • Multi-factor auth

  • Password-less auth

    • JWT

      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JSON Web Token
      • Learn how to use JWT for Authentication - Learn how to use JWT to secure your web app.
      • Managing a Secure JSON Web Token Implementation - JWT has all sorts of flexibility that make it hard to use well.
      • Hardcoded secrets, unverified tokens, and other common JWT mistakes - A good recap of all JWT pitfalls.
      • Adding JSON Web Token API Keys to a DenyList - On token invalidation.
      • Stop using JWT for sessions - And [why your "solution" doesn't work](http://cryto.net/%7Ejoepie91/blog/2016/06/19/stop-using-jwt-for-sessions-part-2-why-your-solution-doesnt-work/), because [stateless JWT tokens cannot be invalidated or updated](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18354141). They will introduce either size issues or security issues depending on where you store them. Stateful JWT tokens are functionally the same as session cookies, but without the battle-tested and well-reviewed implementations or client support.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JOSE is a Bad Standard That Everyone Should Avoid - The standards are either completely broken or complex minefields hard to navigate.
      • JWT.io - Allows you to decode, verify and generate JWT.
      • `loginsrv` - Standalone minimalistic login server providing a JWT login for multiple login backends (htpasswd, OSIAM, user/password, HTTP basic authentication, OAuth2: GitHub, Google, Bitbucket, Facebook, GitLab).
      • `loginsrv` - Standalone minimalistic login server providing a JWT login for multiple login backends (htpasswd, OSIAM, user/password, HTTP basic authentication, OAuth2: GitHub, Google, Bitbucket, Facebook, GitLab).
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • Learn how to use JWT for Authentication - Learn how to use JWT to secure your web app.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • jwtXploiter - A tool to test security of json web token.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • Using JSON Web Tokens as API Keys - Compared to API keys, JWTs offers granular security, homogeneous auth architecture, decentralized issuance, OAuth2 compliance, debuggability, expiration control, device management.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
      • JWT, JWS and JWE for Not So Dummies! - A signed JWT is known as a JWS (JSON Web Signature). In fact a JWT does not exist itself — either it has to be a JWS or a JWE (JSON Web Encryption). Its like an abstract class — the JWS and JWE are the concrete implementations.
    • SMS-based

    • WebAuthn

    • Security key

      • Getting started with security keys - A practical guide to stay safe online and prevent phishing with FIDO2, WebAuthn and security keys.
      • Solo - Open security key supporting FIDO2 & U2F over USB + NFC.
      • OpenSK - Open-source implementation for security keys written in Rust that supports both FIDO U2F and FIDO2 standards.
      • YubiKey Guide - Guide to using YubiKey as a SmartCard for storing GPG encryption, signing and authentication keys, which can also be used for SSH. Many of the principles in this document are applicable to other smart card devices.
      • YubiKey at Datadog - Guide to setup Yubikey, U2F, GPG, git, SSH, Keybase, VMware Fusion and Docker Content Trust.
      • Webauthn and security keys - Describe how authentication works with security keys, details the protocols, and how they articulates with WebAuthn. Key takeaway: “There is no way to create a U2F key with webauthn however. (…) So complete the transition to webauthn of your login process first, then transition registration.”
    • Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)

      • PKI for busy people - Quick overview of the important stuff.
      • Everything you should know about certificates and PKI but are too afraid to ask - PKI lets you define a system cryptographically. It's universal and vendor neutral.
      • `lemur` - Acts as a broker between CAs and environments, providing a central portal for developers to issue TLS certificates with 'sane' defaults.
      • CFSSL - A swiss army knife for PKI/TLS by CloudFlare. Command line tool and an HTTP API server for signing, verifying, and bundling TLS certificates.
      • JA3 - Method for creating SSL/TLS client fingerprints that should be easy to produce on any platform and can be easily shared for threat intelligence.
  • Security

  • Account Management

    • As a user, I want… - A meta-critic of account management, in which features expected by the business clash with real user needs, in the form of user stories written by a fictional project manager.
    • Things end users care about but programmers don't - In the same spirit as above, but broader: all the little things we overlook as developers but users really care about. In the top of that list lies account-centric features, diverse integration and import/export tools. I.e. all the enterprise customers needs to cover.
    • Separate the account, user and login/auth details - Sound advice to lay down the foundation of a future-proof IAM API.
    • Identity Beyond Usernames - On the concept of usernames as identifiers, and the complexities introduced when unicode characters meets uniqueness requirements.
    • Kratos - User login, user registration, 2FA and profile management.
    • Conjur - Automatically secures secrets used by privileged users and machine identities.
    • SuperTokens - Open-source project for login and session management which supports passwordless, social login, email and phone logins.
    • UserFrosting - Modern PHP user login and management framework.
  • Cryptography

      • Cryptographic Right Answers - An up to date set of recommendations for developers who are not cryptography engineers. There's even a [shorter summary](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16749140) available.
      • Real World Crypto Symposium - Aims to bring together cryptography researchers with developers, focusing on uses in real-world environments such as the Internet, the cloud, and embedded devices.
      • An Overview of Cryptography - “This paper has two major purposes. The first is to define some of the terms and concepts behind basic cryptographic methods, and to offer a way to compare the myriad cryptographic schemes in use today. The second is to provide some real examples of cryptography in use today.”
      • Papers we love: Cryptography - Foundational papers of cryptography.
      • Lifetimes of cryptographic hash functions - “If you are using compare-by-hash to generate addresses for data that can be supplied by malicious users, you should have a plan to migrate to a new hash every few years”.
    • Identifiers

  • Zero-trust Network

    • Identifiers

      • BeyondCorp: A New Approach to Enterprise Security - Quick overview of Google's Zero-trust Network initiative.
      • What is BeyondCorp? What is Identity-Aware Proxy? - More companies add extra layers of VPNs, firewalls, restrictions and constraints, resulting in a terrible experience and a slight security gain. There's a better way.
      • oathkeeper - Identity & Access Proxy and Access Control Decision API that authenticates, authorizes, and mutates incoming HTTP requests. Inspired by the BeyondCorp / Zero Trust white paper.
      • Pomerium - An identity-aware proxy that enables secure access to internal applications.
  • Authentication

  • Password-based auth

  • Authorization

    • Policy models

      • Access Control Lists - based_access_control). In this section we explore lots of different patterns and architectures.
      • Why Authorization is Hard - Because it needs multiple tradeoffs on Enforcement which is required in so many places, on Decision architecture to split business logic from authorization logic, and on Modeling to balance power and complexity.
      • The never-ending product requirements of user authorization - How a simple authorization model based on roles is not enough and gets complicated fast due to product packaging, data locality, enterprise organizations and compliance.
      • RBAC like it was meant to be - How we got from DAC (unix permissions, secret URL), to MAC (DRM, MFA, 2FA, SELinux), to RBAC. Details how the latter allows for better modeling of policies, ACLs, users and groups.
      • The Case for Granular Permissions - Discuss the limitations of RBAC and how ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control) addresses them.
      • In Search For a Perfect Access Control System - The historical origins of authorization schemes. Hints at the future of sharing, trust and delegation between different teams and organizations.
      • Semantic-based Automated Reasoning for AWS Access Policies using SMT - Zelkova is how AWS does it. This system perform symbolic analysis of IAM policies, and solve the reachability of resources according user's rights and access constraints. Also see the higher-level [introduction given at re:inforce 2019](https://youtu.be/x6wsTFnU3eY?t=2111).
      • Zanzibar: Google's Consistent, Global Authorization System - Scales to trillions of access control lists and millions of authorization requests per second to support services used by billions of people. It has maintained 95th-percentile latency of less than 10 milliseconds and availability of greater than 99.999% over 3 years of production use. [Other bits not in the paper](https://twitter.com/LeaKissner/status/1136626971566149633). [Zanzibar Academy](https://zanzibar.academy/) is a site dedicated to explaining how Zanzibar works.
      • authz system that is built around labeled security and RBAC concepts
      • Authorization Academy - An in-depth, vendor-agnostic treatment of authorization that emphasizes mental models. This guide shows the reader how to think about their authorization needs in order to make good decisions about their authorization architecture and model.
      • SpiceDB - An open source database system for managing security-critical application permissions inspired by Zanzibar.
      • AWS IAM Roles, a tale of unnecessary complexity - The history of fast-growing AWS explains how the current scheme came to be, and how it compares to GCP's resource hierarchy.
      • GCP's IAM syntax is better than AWS's - The minutiae of permission design in GCP improves the developer's experience.
    • AWS policy tools

      • AWS IAM policies
      • Become an AWS IAM Policy Ninja - “In my nearly 5 years at Amazon, I carve out a little time each day, each week to look through the forums, customer tickets to try to find out where people are having trouble.”
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
      • Aardvark and Repokid - Netflix tools to enforce least privilege on AWS. The idea is that the default policy on new things is deny all, and then it monitors cloudtrail for privilege failures and reconfigures IAM to allow the smallest possible privilege to get rid of that deny message.
    • Macaroons

    • Open-source policy frameworks

      • Keto - Policy decision point. It uses a set of access control policies, similar to AWS policies, in order to determine whether a subject is authorized to perform a certain action on a resource.
      • Ladon - Access control library, inspired by AWS.
      • Casbin - Open-source access control library for Golang projects.
      • Open Policy Agent - An open-source general-purpose decision engine to create and enforce attribute-based access control (ABAC) policies.
      • Topaz - An open-source project which combines the policy-as-code and decision logging of OPA with a Zanzibar-modeled directory.
      • Open Policy Administration Layer - Open Source administration layer for OPA, detecting changes to both policy and policy data in realtime and pushing live updates to OPA agents. OPAL brings open-policy up to the speed needed by live applications.
      • Gubernator - High performance rate-limiting micro-service and library.
      • Oso - A batteries-included library for building authorization in your application.
      • Cerbos - An authorization endpoint to write context-aware access control policies.
      • Warrant - A relationship based access control (ReBAC) engine (inspired by Google Zanzibar) also capable of enforcing any authorization paradigm, including RBAC and ABAC.
      • Biscuit - Biscuit merge concepts from cookies, JWTs, macaroons and Open Policy Agent. “It provide a logic language based on Datalog to write authorization policies. It can store data, like JWT, or small conditions like Macaroons, but it is also able to represent more complex rules like role-based access control, delegation, hierarchies.”
  • OAuth2 & OpenID

    • Macaroons

      • OAuth 2.0
      • An Illustrated Guide to OAuth and OpenID Connect - Explain how these standards work using simplified illustrations.
      • OAuth 2 Simplified - A reference article describing the protocol in simplified format to help developers and service providers implement it.
      • OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect (in plain English) - Starts with an historical context on how these standards came to be, clears up the innacuracies in the vocabulary, then details the protocols and its pitfalls to make it less intimidating.
      • Everything You Need to Know About OAuth (2.0) - A good overview with a practical case study on how Teleport, an open-source remote access tool, allows users to log in through GitHub SSO.
      • OAuth in one picture - A nice summary card.
      • How to Implement a Secure Central Authentication Service in Six Steps - Got multiple legacy systems to merge with their own login methods and accounts? Here is how to merge all that mess by the way of OIDC.
      • Open-Sourcing BuzzFeed's SSO Experience - OAuth2-friendly adaptation of the Central Authentication Service (CAS) protocol. You'll find there good OAuth user flow diagrams.
      • OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice - “Updates and extends the OAuth 2.0 Security Threat Model to incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader application”.
      • Hidden OAuth attack vectors - How to identify and exploit some of the key vulnerabilities found in OAuth 2.0 authentication mechanisms.
      • Hydra - Open-source OIDC & OAuth2 Server.
      • Keycloak - Open-source Identity and Access Management. Supports OIDC, OAuth 2 and SAML 2, LDAP and AD directories, password policies.
      • authentik - Open-source Identity Provider similar to Keycloak.
      • The Decline of OpenID - OpenID is being replaced in the public web to a mix of OAuth 1, OAuth 2 or other proprietary SSO protocols.
      • Why Mastercard Doesn't Use OAuth 2.0 - “They did this to provide message-level integrity. OAuth 2 switched to transport-level confidentiality/integrity.” (which TLS provides) ([source](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17486165)).
      • OAuth 2.0 and the Road to Hell - The resignation letter from the lead author and editor of the Oauth 2.0 specification.
      • Keycloak - Open-source Identity and Access Management. Supports OIDC, OAuth 2 and SAML 2, LDAP and AD directories, password policies.
      • The problem with OAuth for Authentication - “The problem is that OAuth 2.0 is a Delegated Authorization protocol, and not a Authentication protocol.” 10 years after, this article is still the best explanation on [why use OpenID Connect instead of plain OAuth2](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/260519)?
  • SAML

    • Macaroons

      • What's the Difference Between OAuth, OpenID Connect, and SAML? - Identity is hard. Another take on the different protocol is always welcome to help makes sense of it all.
      • How SAML 2.0 Authentication Works - Overview of the how and why of SSO and SAML.
      • Web Single Sign-On, the SAML 2.0 perspective - Another naive explanation of SAML workflow in the context of corporate SSO implementation.
      • The Beer Drinker's Guide to SAML - SAML is arcane at times. A another analogy might helps get more sense out of it.
      • SAML is insecure by design - Not only weird, SAML is also insecure by design, as it relies on signatures based on XML canonicalization, not XML byte stream. Which means you can exploit XML parser/encoder differences.
      • The Difficulties of SAML Single Logout - On the technical and UX issues of single logout implementations.
      • The SSO Wall of Shame - A documented rant on the exessive pricing practiced by SaaS providers to activate SSO on their product. The author's point is, as a core security feature, SSO should be reasonnably priced and not part of an exclusive tier.
      • SAML vs. OAuth - “OAuth is a protocol for authorization: it ensures Bob goes to the right parking lot. In contrast, SAML is a protocol for authentication, or allowing Bob to get past the guardhouse.”
      • The Difference Between SAML 2.0 and OAuth 2.0 - “Even though SAML was actually designed to be widely applicable, its contemporary usage is typically shifted towards enterprise SSO scenarios. On the other hand, OAuth was designed for use with applications on the Internet, especially for delegated authorisation.”
  • Secret Management

  • Trust & Safety

  • Blocklists

    • Captcha

      • Bloom Filter - Perfect for this use-case, as bloom filters are designed to quickly check if an element is not in a (large) set. Variations of bloom filters exist for specific data types.
    • Hostnames and Subdomains

      • The Public Suffix List - Mozilla's registry of public suffixes, under which Internet users can (or historically could) directly register names.
      • #1 - blacklist/blob/master/subdomain-blacklist.txt), [#3](https://github.com/nccgroup/typofinder/blob/master/TypoMagic/datasources/subdomains.txt), [#4](https://www.quora.com/How-do-sites-prevent-vanity-URLs-from-colliding-with-future-features).
      • `common-domain-prefix-suffix-list.tsv` - Top-5000 most common domain prefix/suffix list.
      • `xkeyscorerules100.txt` - NSA's [XKeyscore](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XKeyscore) matching rules for TOR and other anonymity preserving tools.
      • AMF site blocklist - Official French denylist of money-related fraud sites.
    • Emails

      • Temporary Email Address Domains - A list of domains for disposable and temporary email addresses. Useful for filtering your email list to increase open rates (sending email to these domains likely will not be opened).
    • Reserved IDs

  • Privacy

  • UX/UI

  • Competitive Analysis

    • GDPR

      • AWS Security, Identity & Compliance announcements - The source of all new features added to the IAM perimeter.
      • GCP IAM release notes - Also of note: [Identity](https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/release-notes), [Identity Platform](https://cloud.google.com/identity-platform/docs/release-notes), [Resource Manager](https://cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/release-notes), [Key Management Service/HSM](https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/release-notes), [Access Context Manager](https://cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/release-notes), [Identity-Aware Proxy](https://cloud.google.com/iap/docs/release-notes), [Data Loss Prevention](https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/release-notes) and [Security Scanner](https://cloud.google.com/security-scanner/docs/release-notes).
      • Unofficial Weekly Google Cloud Platform newsletter - Relevant keywords: [`IAM`](https://www.gcpweekly.com/gcp-resources/tag/iam/) and [`Security`](https://www.gcpweekly.com/gcp-resources/tag/security/).
      • DigitalOcean Accounts changelog - All the latest accounts updates on DO.
      • 163 AWS services explained in one line each - Help makes sense of their huge service catalog. In the same spirit: [AWS in simple terms](https://netrixllc.com/blog/aws-services-in-simple-terms/) & [AWS In Plain English](https://expeditedsecurity.com/aws-in-plain-english/).
      • Google Cloud Developer's Cheat Sheet - Describe all GCP products in 4 words or less.
  • History

    • GDPR

      • cryptoanarchy.wiki - Cypherpunks overlaps with security. This wiki compiles information about the movement, its history and the people/events of note.
  • Footnotes

    • GDPR

      • 1\ - quote-ref)